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Abstract 
 
Information systems (IS’s) support a multitude of functions vital to the modern 
society. IS’s carry an ever increasing volume of data and information, including personal 
pictures, health data or financial transactions. Continuously increasing rates of cyber-attacks 
have led to the subsequent need to rapidly develop secure IS. To develop secure IS’s, 
security goals need to be identified and fulfilled accordingly. Goal-oriented development 
fulfils the achievement of security goal by providing a methodology that enables security 
requirement elicitation throughout the entire development of an information system. This is 
achieved by considering every component of a system as an actor that is driven by goals 
that the actor strives to achieve. Nevertheless goal-oriented modeling has proven itself to be 
valid it maintains multiple shortcomings. The main disadvantage lays in the high granularity 
of the process making it complex very fast and subsequently raising the level of complexity 
of the overall process. Therefore a structured approach that would provide a step-by-step 
guide throughout the application of the process would be essential. Security patterns are 
proven to be reusable solutions that address recurring security problems which are 
commonly faced during the process of software development. In this master thesis we 
investigate the integration of a pattern based security requirement elicitation process in the 
goal-oriented IS development. By performing this integration we aim at providing a process 
that enables the elicitation of security requirements from Security Risk-aware Secure Tropos 
(RAST) models. RAST is a security goal-oriented modeling language that is applicable 
throughout the complete process of software development from early to late requirements, 
architecture, detailed design and final implementation. 
The contribution of this thesis are five Security Risk-aware Patterns expressed using 
RAST. The thesis outlines the steps to be executed to apply the proposed security patterns. 
We validated our contribution by performing a case study that confirmed the overall 
usability of our proposed patterns and the pattern application process. Additionally the case 
study determined that the provided patterns can be used as a starting point for a faster and 
more efficient in identifying security requirements. 
 
Keywords: Security engineering, Security risk-oriented patterns, Secure Tropos, Security 
requirement 
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Mustripõhiste Turvalisusnõuete Derivatsioon Security Risk-aware Secure 
Tropos Mudeli Abil 
 
Sisukokkuvõte 
 
Informatsioonisüsteem (IS) toetab suurt hulka modernse ühiskonna jaoks olulisi 
funktsioone. IS sisaldab üha suurenevat hulka andmeid ja informatsiooni, sealhulgas perso-
naalseid pilte ja andmeid tervise või finantstehingute kohta. Üha suurenev küberrünnakute 
arv on tinginud vajaduse turvaliste infosüsteemide kiiremaks loomiseks. Et arendada turva-
list IS-i, tuleb tuvastada turbe-eesmärgid ning need vastavalt ellu viia. Tulemuspõhine aren-
dus tagab turbe-eesmärkide tulemuslikkuse, pakkudes metodoloogiat, mis võimaldab turva-
lisuse nõuete induktsiooni läbi kogu informatsioonisüsteemi arenduse protsessi. See on saa-
vutatav, kui võtta igat süsteemikomponenti kui eesmärgile orienteeritud osa. Olgugi, et tu-
lemuspõhine modelleerimine on kasulikuks osutunud, on sellel ka mõningaid puuduseid. 
Peamine puudus peitub detailsuses, mille tõttu see protsess võib lühikese ajaga muutuda 
komplekseks, tõstes ka kogu ülejäänut protsessi keerukusetaset. Seetõttu on oluline kasu-
tada struktureeritud lähenemisviisi, mis võimaldab kogu protsessi jooksul samm-sammulist 
juhendit rakendada. Turvalisuse mustrid on korduvkasutatavadja võimaldavad lahendada 
tarkvaraarenduse protsessi käigus sagedasti ilmnevaid probleeme. Käesolevas magistritöös 
uuritakse mustripõhise turvanõuete kogumise protsessi integreerimist, tulemuspõhise IS-i 
arendamisel. Selle eesmärgiks on SRP’d (Security Risk-oriented Patterns) kasutades pak-
kuda protsessi, mis võimaldab turvanõuete induktsiooni RAST (Security Risk-aware Secure 
Tropos) mudelis. RAST on turvalisuse tulemuspõhise modelleerimise keel, mis on kohal-
datav läbi kogu tarkvaraarenduse protsessi nii varasematele kui hilisematele nõudlustele, 
arhitektuurile, üksikasjalikule projekteerimisele kui ka lõplikule rakendamisele.  
Käesoleva magistritöö panus on viie SRP avaldamine, kasutades selleks RAST mo-
delleerimise keelt. Töös tuuakse välja sammud, mida väljapakutud turvalisuse mustrite ra-
kendamiseks kasutada. Töö autor annab omapoolse panuse viies läbi juhtumiuuringu, mis 
kinnitab autori poolt pakutud mustrite üldise kasutamisest selle rakenduse protsessist. Juh-
tumiuuringust selgus ka, et töös välja pakutud mustreid on võimalik kasutada süsteemi ana-
lüüsi alguspunktina, et kiirendada turvalisuse nõuete väljaselgitamisprotsessi ning seda 
efektiivsemaks muuta. 
 
Võtmesõnad: Turvalisusetehnika, Turvalisuse Riskorienteeritud Mustrid, Secure Tropos, 
Turvalisuse nõuded 
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1 Introduction 
 
Goal-oriented information system development enables security requirement elicitation 
through goals. Following this methodology goals represent objectives of a system. The 
system itself is considered as an actor striving to achieve the aforementioned goals. 
Following a traditional security solution development methodology in a goal-oriented 
environment is a favorable approach. Nonetheless given an information system with a 
moderate complexity, identifying risks and vulnerabilities can become a complicated task. 
To address this complexity we propose the integration of Security Risk-oriented Patterns 
(SRP’s) in the goal-oriented information system development. A pattern-based approach 
encompasses a number of advantages in comparison to a traditional methodology.  
Advantages include: faster development, proven security results and ease of application by 
inexperienced analysts. 
The scope of this thesis is the elicitation of security requirements using SRP’s in a goal-
oriented environment such as Security Risk-Aware Secure Tropos (RAST) (Matulevičius et 
al., 2012). In order to analyze the various scenarios we employ Information System Security 
Risk Management (ISSRM) (Mayer, 2009) (Dubois, et al., 2010) - that is a framework for 
risk analysis. Beyond the scope of thesis is the prioritization and implementation of the 
various controls represented by the pattern, therewith it will not be considered within this 
thesis. 
In this thesis we resolved research question: 
RQ:  How  to  integrate  security  risk-oriented  patterns  in  the  goal-oriented  infor-
mation  system development? 
The contribution of this work is a proposed integration of SRP’s in the goal-oriented 
information system development. We achieved this by constructing a process that represents 
SRP’s using RAST in conjunction with the Security Risk-oriented Pattern Template 
(Ahmed & Matulevičius 2014). Also using our proposed representation we introduce five 
SRP’s. In addition to the core contribution of the pattern representation we describe a pattern 
application method to be used to apply SRP’s in RAST models. Finally we conducted a case 
study to confirm the usability of our proposed pattern application process. The results, 
affirmed our research contribution. 
This master thesis includes seven chapters. Chapter 1 is dedicated to the introductory 
overview of this master thesis. This chapter explains the motivation for this paper in addition 
to the scope, main research question, as well as the contribution and structuring of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 examines an overview of the process and domain model of the Information 
System Security Risk Management methodology adapted from (Mayer, 2009) and (Dubois 
et al., 2010). Chapter 3 is devoted to a brief overview of modeling languages for security 
risk management i.e. Mal(icious)-Activity Diagrams (Sindre, 2007) (Chowdhury et. al, 
2012), Misuse Cases (Sindre & Opdahl, 2002), (Soomro & Ahmed 2013), Secure Tropos 
(Mouratidis, 2007) in addition to presenting the main modeling language for this thesis - 
Security Risk-aware Secure Troops (Matulevičius et al., 2012) - followed by an illustrative 
example using one of our running examples. Chapter 4 overviews security patterns and their 
classification (Schumacher et. al., 2013), and presents one of the SRP’s that are part of the 
contribution of this master thesis. Chapter 5 illustrates our contribution where we present 
the pattern application process using a model from (Yu, 1994) and SRP1, additionally a 
brief representation of all the patterns applied in the previously mentioned model. Chapter 
6 outlines the case study conducted in order to validate the usability of the patterns illustrated 
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in this thesis and their application process. In the closing Chapter 7, we address the research 
question and close with concluding remarks and suggestions for future research on these 
issues. The appendix includes the rest of our proposed patterns that are part of this thesis’s 
contribution in addition to the abstract syntax of Risk Aware Secure Tropos, as well as the 
complete case study reports of each participant. 
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2 Security Risk Management for Information Systems 
In this chapter we overview the Information System Security Risk Management 
(ISSRM) domain model. Moreover, we examine the process followed by the ISSRM 
approach in order to elicit security requirements. We conclude by providing an illustrative 
example of the security risk management process using a running example. 
2.1 Domain Model 
ISSRM is a methodology that assists in detection, evaluation and mitigation of 
security risks. Moreover it improves upon the entirety of crucial matters in the development 
of secure information systems (Mayer 2009). The ISSRM domain model is composed three 
main conceptual categories - asset related concepts, risk related concepts and risk treatment 
related concepts (see domain model in Figure 2.1). 
 
Fig 2.1 - ISSRM Domain Model; adapted from (Dubois et al., 2010) and (Mayer, 2009) 
 
Asset-related concepts describe valuable subjects and objects of an organization that 
require protection. They are divided into security criteria, business and IS assets. Security 
criterion is characterized as a constraint to an asset that defines its security needs. Business 
assets include assets of an organization that represent its core business process and result in 
the organization achieving the desired outcomes related to its functional aspects. IS assets 
are assets related to the IS infrastructure.  
Risk related concepts define risk levels that assets are exposed to. These concepts 
are risk, impact, event, threat, and threat agent, vulnerability, and attack method. Risk 
identifies the level of harmfulness of a threat towards a specific asset. Impact describes the 
result of exposure of an asset, to a specific risk. Event is defined as a potentially harmful 
combination of threat and one or more vulnerabilities of the system. Vulnerability is a flaw 
of an asset that compromises system security. A threat is the malicious intention of a threat 
agent to cause harm to the organization. Attack method refers to the process of a threat agent 
to cause damage or exploit an organization. 
 
13 
 
Risk treatment related concepts mitigate potential risks of the system. Main concepts 
are risk treatment, security requirements and control. A risk treatment refers to the process 
of mitigating a risk identified by a risk related concept. Propositions of these concept group, 
include how to improve a company's security level by means of reducing, avoiding, and 
transferring or retaining a risk. A security requirement, identified by the risk related concept 
group, refers to an IS requirement suggesting on how to deal with potential risks. Control is 
defined as the process of countering a risk with a strategy suggested previously by a security 
requirement concept, avoiding a threat and stabilizing the condition. 
 
2.2 Security Risk Management Process 
The risk management process consists of six steps that can be seen in Figure 2.2. It 
initiates with the general study of the system and clear establishment of the assets included. 
As a second step the security objectives of the system are identified. The third step of the 
process is the performance of a risk analysis, where potential security objectives or assets 
that are at risk are identified. Here at the end of this step an assessment is performed and in 
case the assessment is satisfactory a fourth step follows by establishing the risk treatment 
for the risks identified in the previous step. The fifth step suggests the elicitation of IS 
security requirements followed by a final step - control selection and implementation. In 
this step specific countermeasures established in the previous phases get approved as main 
strategy and executed to avoid the threat and reach a condition of security and stability. 
 
 
Fig 2.2 - ISSRM Process; adapted from (Mayer, 2009) 
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2.3 ISSRM Process Example 
Following the ISSRM security risk management process we decompose and analyze 
our running example following previously described six steps.  
Our running example is of an individual that is exposed to a shoulder surfing attack. 
In this example at some point in time an individual while being in a public environment 
decides to use his email account. The individual proceeds to login unsuspicious of anyone 
looking at him. An attacker by using the method of shoulder surfing observes the password 
and the email. The attacker proceeds to use the persons email account to login into various 
websites where the user is a member and by resetting the password set by the user and 
extorts sensitive data. 
The first step includes content and asset identification. We identify as business asset 
the user’s email and password data information and IS asset we identify the user himself as 
a person due to the fact that he supports the business data. In the second step we identify the 
security objectives. Here we specify the confidentiality of the email and the confidentiality 
of the password of the user as main security objective. As a third step that is risk assessment 
and analysis we identify a threat agent as an attacker with social engineering skills and 
willingness to shoulder surf and obstruct the data. In the fourth step as risk treatment we 
specify risk reduction. The fifth step we define as a security requirement “Use the email and 
password in private”. Finally, the sixth and last step the security control that we introduce 
is to make sure that no one is watching you while entering the password. In Table 1 we 
decompose the example to it’s of the ISSRM domain model assets. 
Table 1 - Running Example In Terms of Security Domain Model Concepts 
Asset-related Concepts 
Business Asset User email, User password 
IS Asset User 
Security Criterion Confidentiality of the user’s email. 
Confidentiality of the user’s password. 
Risk-related Concepts 
Risk Attacker performs shoulder surfing and memorizes the users email login data 
due to user inattentiveness towards personal data. Resulting in the loss of the 
confidentiality of the email and the confidentiality of the password. 
Impact Loss of the confidentiality of the user’s email. 
Loss of the confidentiality of the user’s password. 
Event Attacker performs shoulder surfing and memorizes the users email login data 
due to user inattentiveness towards personal data. 
Vulnerability User inattentiveness towards personal data. 
Threat Attacker performs shoulder surfing and memorizes the users email login data. 
Threat Agent An attacker with social engineering skills and willingness to shoulder surf and 
obstruct the data. 
Attack Method Shoulder surf and memorize the email or password. 
Risk Treatment-related Concepts 
Risk Treatment Risk reduction 
Security Requirement Use the email and password in private. 
Control Make sure that no one is watching you while entering the password. 
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter we overviewed the ISSRM domain model. We described the ISSRM 
process followed to elicit security requirements. Lastly using our running example, we il-
lustrated the core concepts of ISSRM and its processes. 
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3 Modelling Languages for Security Risk Management 
In this chapter we provide an overview of modeling languages from the relevant 
literature. Additionally we provide an introduction to Security risk-aware Secure Troops the 
modeling language utilized in this master thesis followed by a textual and illustrative 
example. 
 
3.1 Mal-Activity Diagrams 
Mal(icious)-Activity Diagrams (MAD) complement UML Activity Diagrams by 
integrating a workflow that introduces security requirement elicitation within the context of 
the early design phases of an IS’s (Sindre, 2007). Syntactically and semantically MAD 
follows the same design as UML activity diagrams. MAD adds a malicious activity in a 
separate swim lane, and indicates a malicious actor by using the invert color scheme from 
the one of the actors of the same diagram. Additionally a malicious decision box is 
introduced that depicts the malicious action options that a malicious actor performs with a 
malicious activity wherever appropriate. 
In (Chowdhury et. al, 2012) a concept alignment between ISSRM and MAD is 
introduced. Asset related concepts of business asset map to the concepts of decision, 
activity, and control flow whereas IS assets map to the concepts contained within a swim 
lane, concept alignment to security criterion cannot be determined. Risk related concepts of 
threat agent aligns to the mal-swim lane and attack method to the combination of mal-
activity constructs, impact aligns to mal-activities. Nonetheless there is no alignment to a 
construct of MAD that represent vulnerabilities. Risk treatment concepts of control align 
to swim lane and security requirement to the mitigation activity. 
 
3.2 Misuse Cases 
Misuse Cases (MUC) are an extension to Unified Modeling Language (UML) Use 
Cases (Sindre & Opdahl, 2002). They address the inability of use cases to extensively 
elicitate security requirements in the early phases of the design process of an IS. MUC align 
misusers to actors and use cases to misuse cases. A misuser is an actor that with or without 
the intention compromises a system through a misuse case. A misuse case is the process 
followed by a misuser that leads to unwanted results for the entity that are imposed to. In 
Table.1 we showcase the MC constructs. 
In (Soomro & Ahmed 2013) a risk-oriented extension to MC is introduced, Security 
Risk-oriented Misuse Cases (SROMUC) enables elicitation of security requirements 
following the ISSRM process. Asset related concepts align to the Actor concept, business 
and IS concepts are represented by a respective use case type, security criterion is 
represented by a security constraint construct and support relationships are represented by 
the <<extends>> and << includes>> relationships. Risk-related concepts of attacker are 
represented by the MC concept of misuser, attack method is described by a misuse case and 
vulnerability by a gray colored misuse case. Threats are aligned to the combination of a 
misuser and a misuse case whereas the targets relation maps to the threatens relationship of 
SROMUC. A rounded rectangle is introduced with the purpose of representing ISSRM 
concept of impact. Additionally exploits is defined as a relationship between a misuse case 
and vulnerability, leads to is represented by the relationship of misuse cases and impact and 
harm is defined by the relationship of impact and business use case. Moreover negates is 
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represented by the link of impact and security criterion whereas a combination of threat 
agent, attack method, impact and vulnerability represents an event and risk is introduced as 
the combination of event and impact. Risk treatment-related concepts in SROMUC update 
the modeling syntax of security use case. By adding a padlock within the label of a security 
use case that aligns to the security requirement concept of ISSRM. The mitigates 
relationship aligns to a mitigates relationship from security use case. 
 
3.3 Secure Tropos 
Secure Tropos (ST) (Mouratidis, 2007) is an agent oriented security requirements 
elicitation and modelling methodology. It is an extension of the Tropos methodology 
(Bresciani et. al, 2004). The proposed methodology addresses the inability of Troops to 
clearly and distinctly represent and model security requirements. ST follows the process of 
software development, starting entirety from early to late requirements, architecture, 
detailed design and final implementation. The methodology focuses on actors, their goals, 
accessible resources, performed tasks and social dependencies. ST incorporates all the major 
elements and concepts that render Tropos a multi agent system methodology. In brief an 
Actor is an entity that is part of the multi agent system and is driven by certain goals and 
intentions. A role is the set of distinctive characteristics that characterize the behavior within 
the system of an actor. As a Hard-goal is defined the desired state that an actor is determined 
to achieve, whereas a Soft-goal is again a desired state yet there is no clear determination of 
how this state is to be achieved. A task is the sequence followed by an actor in order to 
achieve and satisfy a certain goal. As a resource is stated to be an important item of 
information required by an actor. Between two or more actors Dependencies exist in terms 
of achieving a goal. Capability is the definition of the ability of an actor to carry and 
complete a certain task. All the corresponding modeling elements can be seen in Table.2. In 
addition to the using the Tropos concepts ST introduces concepts that enable ST to elicitate 
and model security requirements. More extensively Constraint and Security Constraint is a 
security related limitation or restriction that crucially impacts the development of the system 
in design, limit the liberties that might be taken from certain agents or is in conflict with 
another component of the architecture. Additionaly ST introduces a Secure Dependency that 
describes one or more security contrarians. These constraints have to be achieved in order 
for the dependency that relies on them to be resolved.  
  
 In Table 2 we present a side by side representation of all the modeling constructs of 
all the previously overviewed modeling language. All the constructs are represented in terms 
of their aligning of ISSRM concepts. The constructs in the table are from the resulting 
alignment of each modeling language to ISSRM 
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Table 2 - Language Correspondence to ISSRM Regarding Concepts; adapted from (Matulevičius et al., 2012) 
ISSRM SECURE TROPOS/RAST MISSUSE CASES MAL-ACTIVITIES 
Asset-related Concepts 
Business Asset 
 
Combined using dependency, 
contribution, means-ends and de-
composition links 
 
Combined 
using  
extends,       
includes 
and combi-
nation links 
 
Combined using control flow 
IS Asset 
  
Security Crite-
rion 
 
Combined using 
contribution and 
security constraint 
decomposition  
- 
Risk-related Concepts 
Risk Combination of Impact and Event Combination of Impact 
and Event 
Combination of Impact and Event 
Impact 
 
 
 
Combined in the mal-swim lane 
that expresses attack method 
Event 
 
Or: Combination of vulnerability and 
threat. 
Combination of vul-
nerability and 
threat. 
Combination of vulnerability 
and threat (Implicitly de-
fined). 
Vulnerability 
 
Added to the IS asset such as goal, task 
or resource. 
 
- 
Threat 
 
Combination of attack 
method and threat 
agent 
Combination of attack method 
and threat agent 
Threat Agent 
 
  
Attack Method 
 
Potentially combined with other 
tasks using decomposition links 
 
Potentially combined 
with other misuse cases 
using includes and ex-
tends links 
As method: 
 
Combined using 
control flow links 
 
As means: 
 
 
Risk Treatment-related Concepts 
Risk Treatment - - - 
Security Re-
quirement 
 
Combined using 
dependency, con-
tribution, means-
ends and decom-
position links 
 
Combined using extends,       
includes links  
Combined us-
ing control flow 
links 
Control 
- - 
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3.4 Security Risk-Aware Secure Tropos 
Security risk-aware Secure Troops (RAST) (Matulevičius et al., 2012) is a syntactic, 
semantic and methodological extension of the ST methodology focused on the enhancement 
of the early stages of IS development. The proposed methodology addresses the void of 
addressing assets, risks and risk treatments alike, with a cohesive modeling approach that 
follows the ISSRM methodology. This extension of ST provides the ability of using ST 
modeling concepts wherever possible utilizing the already existing constructs. Additionally, 
whenever void or ambiguity exits, new constructs are introduced to address risk related 
scenarios. In detail the core constructs of RAST are: The Actor, which is an entity that is 
part of a system and is driven by certain goals and intentions. The Goal, which is defined as 
the desired state that an actor is determined to achieve. The Plan, which is a course of action 
followed by an actor in order to achieve and satisfy a goal. The Resource, which is an 
important item of information required by an actor. The Threat, which is the course of action 
followed by an attacker to harm the system. The Attacker, which is a malicious entity with 
intention to harm the system. The Malicious Goal, which is a goal that indicates a malicious 
goal of an attacker. The Vulnerability, that is an additional construct utilized in order to 
indicate that a plan/resource/goal are vulnerable assets. The Malicious Plan, which is a plan 
that indicates a malicious plan of an attacker. Moreover for a deeper understanding of the 
modeling process of RAST the abstract syntax can be found in the appendix. 
 
RAST - ISSRM Alignment 
Asset Related Concepts: The ISSRM modeling concepts of assets are modeled using 
the already existing ST constructs of goal, softgoal, actor, plan and resource. The 
relationships between the assets, are modeled using the construct of contribution which 
indicates a connection where a construct positively or negatively contributes in the 
achievement of a plan or goal. The means-ends relationship, which indicates a connection 
where a construct such as plan/resource/goal is the means to achieve another plan/goal. 
Decomposition which provides a decomposition of a goal/or plan into sub-goals and sub-
plan respectively. The support between business assets and IS assets is modeled using the 
respective to the circumstances ST relationship. Security criterion is modeled and 
represented by combining a softgoal and/or a security constraint. The constraints of 
relationship can be modeled both implicitly and explicitly. Implicitly by restricting a task, 
goal or resource as a dependum and explicitly by restricting through a relationship. 
Risk Related Concepts: In order to properly distinguish risk related concepts it is 
suggested to use darker colors. RAST represents a threat agent through the actor construct, 
attack method as a plan and threat as a goal and/or plan respectively. Vulnerability is 
represented through the RAST introduced vulnerability point. The targets relationship is 
represented through the attacks relationship. Additionally, RAST introduces the exploits 
relationship that aims to represent the link between a plan and an asset that includes 
vulnerability point. An event is represented through the aggregation of attack method, threat 
agent and vulnerability. Moreover risk is modeled by combing a risk and an event. 
Risk-Treatment Related Concepts: The risk-treatment related concepts of security 
requirement and control are to be modeled through the combination of a goal, softgoal, plan 
and security constraint using the modeling concepts with similar depiction with the addition 
of a doted background. Additionally the, mitigates relationship is used to indicate a 
connection where a construct or group of constructs mitigate a certain threat to the system. 
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Why Risk-Aware Secure Tropos? 
Contemplating on the individual characteristics of MUC, MAD, ST and RAST we 
decide to employ RAST as the main modeling language used for modeling security 
scenarios throughout this master thesis. We attribute the choice of this modeling approach 
to multiple reasons. RAST has an advantage over MUC and MAD due to the granularity of 
the models. Moreover RAST is advantageous over ST due to its alignment to ISSRM and 
ability to model risk assessment. Being an agent oriented language, RAST includes the 
advantage of being easy to comprehend and educate others.  Moreover, we determined that 
this modeling language covers all the facets of the ISSRM process and additionally provides 
with a level of modeling granularity that is adequate to the complexity of the scenarios and 
patterns presented in this work. 
 
Modeling activities of RAST using running example 
For the purpose of illustrating the modeling activities of RAST in this section we use 
our running example presented in Chapter 1. The example describes an individual accessing 
his email in public and being subject to a shoulder surfing attack. 
Stage 1. Asset identification and security objective identification 
In this stage a separation is made in the modeling process between business and IS 
assets. Herby here two diagrams are created to model this two different assets. In Figure 3.1 
we initiate by modeling our business assets that in the case of our example are the Email 
and Password of a user, and are modeled using the resource construct. Moreover here the 
main focus is to identify and model the goals, plans, resources and other actives of the 
business asset. Continuing, we identify the main goal of the user actor Access Email 
represented by the goal construct. This goal requires the execution of the plan Remember 
email and password in order to be fulfilled. As a next step following ISSRM principles 
security objectives are defined. These objectives can be defined using two different security 
objective identification techniques the “top-down” and “bottom-up”. In the “top-down” 
method softgoals (e.g. Confidentiality) represent general security objectives that are refined 
using security criteria that are expressed in the models through security constraints (e.g. 
Keep email and password confidential). In the ‘bottom-up’ approach implicit security 
requirements are defined through secure dependencies followed by the identification of 
security constraints (e.g. Access email only in private) that are inspected and identified 
according to higher level of security objectives (e.g. Keep email and password 
confidential). 
 
Fig 3.1 - Example Modelling of Business Assets 
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Next IS assets are modeled, in the model the main IS asset that we consider is the 
User actor that supports the business assets by executing the plan Remember email and 
password. In this modeling step concepts of business assets are modeled together with IS 
assets, due to the need of depicting how the IS assets support the business assets. In Figure 
3.2 secure goals are considered as IS assets. Keep email and password confidential is 
fulfilled if the secure goal of Confidentiality of the password and email ensured is 
satisfied. The support of the business asset comes from ensuring security through Ensure 
there are no observers that satisfies the security goals that ultimately results in support 
through assuring the fulfilment of the security constraints. 
 
Fig 3.2 - Example Modelling of IS Assets 
 
Stage 2. Risk analysis and assessment. 
During the second stage potential harmful risks are introduced. This stage initiates 
with the identification of security events. As seen in Figure 3.3 we depict a possible risk that 
our assets will potentially be exposed to Social Engineering Attack at this point the 
attacker through social engineering means attempts to obstruct the email and password of 
the user. In this instance the attack impacts the Confidentiality of the system. Additionally, 
the harm at the business level can be observed. 
 
 
Fig 3.3 - Example Attack Identification 
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The step that follows the identification of risk, is the refinement of the model in 
terms of threat, threat agent, attack method and vulnerability. Here we see the process 
applied to our running example depicted in Figure 3.4. In this instance we identify the 
Attacker that poses a threat (Shoulders surf and memorize the users email login data) 
to our asset. The attacker exploits a vulnerability in the (Ensure there are no observers) 
in order to obtain the users email and password. By using the exploits link we can identify 
the relation of the attack method and the vulnerability of our IS asset.  
 
 
Fig 3.4 - Example Potential Attack Scenario 
 
Stage 3. Security requirements definition. 
As identified in our example of ISSRM process we identified risk reduction as our 
risk treatment method to mitigate the identified attack. Consequently goals and plans should 
be designed with the basis of risk reduction. In this step we introduce the security 
requirement Use the email and password in private. The requirement is represented with 
a doted background Figure 3.5 in order to render clear the distinction from a plan. 
Subsequently the goal Confidentiality of the password and email ensured becomes 
Confidentiality ensured due to its contribution in mitigating the risk. Given the iterative 
nature of this process one could go and recheck the system in the current modeled state and 
introduce new threats and requirements given the need to do so. 
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Fig 3.5 - Example Risk Treatment and Security Requirements Definition 
 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter we overviewed MUC, MAD, ST, RAST and their ISSRM alignment. 
Moreover we justified our decision for choosing RAST as main modeling language of this 
master thesis. Finally we demonstrated the process of modeling with RAST and eliciting 
security requirements using our running example. 
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4 Security Patterns 
In this chapter we overview security patterns and their classifications, focusing in 
enterprise security and risk management patterns. We introduce our contributed pattern 
representation process and finally present our contributed patterns. 
In a software engineering environment, security patterns represent a collection of 
proven solutions and implementations to reoccurring security problems. The solutions 
delivered by security patterns are characterized by their reusability throughout a variety of 
different system implementations. Security patterns are researched extensively in the book 
“Security Patterns Integrating Security and Systems Engineering” Schumacher et. al. 
(Schumacher et. al., 2013) define security patters as: 
“A security pattern describes a particular recurring security problem that arises in 
specific contexts, and presents a well-proven generic solution for it. The solution consists 
of a set of interacting roles that can be arranged into multiple concrete  design structures, 
as well as a process to create one particular such structure.” 
 
4.1 Security pattern classification 
With security patterns delivering solutions to known security problems, this results in 
a numerous amount of patterns that can be hard to navigate. Schumacher et. al. (Schumacher 
et. al., 2013) proposes patterns to be divided into a number of classes. This makes the 
selection of an appropriate pattern easier and faster. Below we give a brief description of 
the classes of security patterns related to this thesis. 
 Enterprise Security and Risk Management Patterns: Enterprise security patterns 
focus in providing the enterprise with patterns that resolve security issues arising in 
the enterprise environment. The patterns are designed following close observation 
of the various functions of the enterprise and its security critical matters. 
 Identification & Authentication Patterns: I&A patters are mainly used in 
environments and conditions where secure identification and authentication of users 
and other stakeholders is crucial. These patterns use multiple different available 
security measures such as passwords and biometrics in order to deliver the best 
possible solutions to security problems. 
 Operating System Access Control Patterns: This patterns are developed in order to 
provide secure access to the extensive intricate file structure and hierarchy of an 
operating system. Main scope of the introduction of this patterns is to securely 
dictate procedures which have to be followed in order to provide the appropriate 
access level to appropriate agents within the context of the system. 
 Firewall Architecture Patterns: These patterns are crucial for security specialists 
and analysts in order for a successful determination of the tradeoff between overall 
system security against external attacks, network connectivity speed, and overall 
system complexity. Given the complex nature of the problem this patterns provide 
with out of solutions and assist in the secure implementation of this security 
mechanism. 
 Cryptographic Key Management Patterns: These security patterns ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of files located within a system, or when in 
transmission. Additionally these patterns guide developers in the implementation of 
secure cryptographic algorithms that result in higher levels of security. 
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4.2 Enterprise security and risk management patterns 
The main scope of enterprise security patterns (Schumacher et. al., 2013) is to provide 
the enterprise with security patterns aimed at resolving security issues that might arise within 
its operational context. These patterns are closely related to the mission and functions of the 
enterprise itself and can be seen in Figure 4.1. These patterns are: Security Needs 
Identification for Enterprise Assets patterns can be considered as the starting point of any 
of the enterprise’s security related considerations, additionally, they take under 
consideration security criteria such as confidentiality integrity and availability. Asset 
Valuation patterns assist in pinpointing the important assets of a business, which in case of 
a compromise can cause crucial financial damage to the enterprise, Threat Assessment 
patterns provide with the ability to gauge and identify threats that may cause harm to the 
business. Vulnerability Assessment patterns cover the determination of potential 
vulnerabilities and the extent of the damage caused to the enterprise if they were to be 
exploited by an attacker. Risk Determination patterns utilize the previously identified 
assets, threat and vulnerabilities in order to determine risks potentially to be faced. 
Enterprise Security Approaches provide the enterprise with a selection of security 
approaches (i.e. prevention, detection and response) these approaches are mainly 
distinguished from others depending on combination of the assessed risks, and asset needed 
to be protected. Moreover this pattern serves as an initial point for the enterprise to define 
its security services. Enterprise Security Services patterns are mainly used following the 
Enterprise Security Approaches patters and provides with the means for the enterprise to 
incorporate security services that will effectively protect the assets at risk. Finally 
Enterprise Partner Communication patterns provide with the means for the enterprise to 
securely incorporate third party services in order to enhance its security without 
compromising it. 
 
Fig 4.1 - The sequence of enterprise SRMP; adapted from (Schumacher et. al., 2013) 
By aligning the security pattern relations depicted in Figure 4.1 with the ISSRM 
concepts Ahmed & Matulevičius (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2011) propose a Security Risk-
oriented Pattern Template as seen in Table 2. Following the proposed guidelines, we use the 
proposed template as part of the representation of the patterns illustrated in this thesis. 
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 Table 2 - Security Risk-oriented Pattern Template; adapted from (Ahmed & Matulevičius, 2011) 
 
4.3 Security Risk-oriented Pattern Representation with RAST 
In this section we demonstrate in detail our proposed representation of Security Risk-
oriented Patterns. In order to represent a pattern we combine a textual description in addition 
to the Security Risk-oriented Pattern Template and RAST. The textual description provides 
initially with an overview of the pattern, followed by the description of the modeling steps 
performed during the modeling off the scenario with RAST. Next we use the Security Risk-
oriented Pattern Template to describe the SRP’s in regard to its ISSRM concepts. Finally 
we provide detailed models of the SRP’s using RAST. In this thesis we describe five SRP’s 
using RAST, in this section we describe SRP1, the rest of the illustrated patterns i.e. SRP2, 
SRP3, SRP4, SRP5 can be found in the respective section II, III, IV and V of the Appendix. 
 
ENTRY DESCRIPTION 
Pattern Name 
This represents the pattern and its security context. It helps to 
remember and refer to a particular pattern.  Normally, the 
name of the secured business activity is stated here. 
Pattern Decision 
It describes the potential pattern application scenario. This 
part includes information regarding the business activity, its 
input and outputs, and the circumstances in which it is appli-
cable. 
A
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-r
el
at
ed
  
C
o
n
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Assets 
An  asset is  any  valuable  element  which  is  necessary  in  
accomplishing the organization’s goal. 
Business Asset 
A business asset can be the information, processes, or skills 
essential for business’s main operation. 
IS Asset 
An IS asset supports business asset, and it is a component of 
IS. 
Security 
Criterion 
A security criterion is a constraint on business asset, which is 
expressed through confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
business asset. 
R
is
k
-r
el
at
ed
 C
o
n
ce
p
ts
 Risk 
A risk is composed of event(s) and their deleterious impacts 
on one or more assets. 
Impact An impact is the potential bad consequences of a risk. 
Event An event is a combination of threat and vulnerability. 
Threat 
A threat agent initiates a threat by using attack method to harm 
one or multiple IS assets by exploiting their vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerability A vulnerability is the weakness or flaw of IS asset. 
Threat Agent A threat agent has means to cause harm to IS assets. 
Attack Method 
An  attack  method  is  the  technique  using  which  a  threat  
agent  fulfils threat. 
R
is
k
  
T
re
at
m
en
t 
re
la
te
d
  
C
o
n
ce
p
ts
 Risk Treatment 
A decision such as: avoidance, reduction, retention for risk 
mitigation. 
Security 
Requirement 
Security requirement is the refined form of risk treatment de-
cision. 
Control A control is the implementation of security requirements. 
Related Patterns(s) 
The place for presenting information about the other related 
SRPs. 
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SRP1 - Securing data-flows between business entities 
The main focus of the SRP1 (Ahmed & Matulevičius 2014), pattern is to secure the 
transmission of confidential data between business entities. This security scenario involves 
an attacker that has the ability to intercept the transmission medium between two business 
entities. The attacker intercepts the transmission between the input interface and the server, 
then obstructs and modifies the data. The attack is facilitated due to the transmission medium 
not being encrypted and data being stored in plaintext. Ultimately the attack leads to the loss 
of the confidentiality of the data and loss of the integrity of the data. In Table 3 we utilise 
the security risk oriented pattern template in order to represent a detailed overview of the 
pattern and move forward with the representation of the pattern using RAST 
Table 3 - SRP1 Asset Identification and Mitigation 
 
In Figure 4.2 we identify as the main business asset the Submitted data that is 
represented by a resource. We identify as a security criterion for both actors (Server, Input 
Interface) the Confidentiality and Integrity of the submitted data. This security criterion 
has a positive contribution from the Maintain the integrity & confidentiality of the 
submitted data security constraint. Moreover, this constraint restricts the main goal of 
Data employed of the Server actor in addition to performing the same restriction to the 
Data submitted goal of the Input interface. In addition to the actor assets in Figure 4.2, the 
Security scenario & security context identification 
Pattern Name Securing data-flows between business entities. 
Pattern Decision This patterns is employed in order to secure data that is transmitted be-
tween business entities. 
Asset-related Concepts 
Business Asset Submitted data 
IS Asset Input interface, Transmission medium, Server 
Security Criterion  Confidentiality of the data. 
 Integrity of the data. 
Risk-related Concepts 
Risk An attacker with the ability to intercept the medium intercepts a transmis-
sion between the input interface and the server, obstructs and modifies the 
data due to the transmission medium not being secure and data not being 
encrypted in the input interface and server, leading to the loss of the con-
fidentiality of the data and loss of the integrity of the data. 
Impact  Loss of the confidentiality of the data. 
 Loss of the integrity of the data 
Event An attacker knowledgeable on how to intercept a transmission medium 
intercepts the transmission between the input interface and the server, ob-
structs and modifies the data due to the transmission medium not being 
secure and data not being encrypted in the input interface and server. 
Threat An attacker intercepts the transmission between the input interface and 
the server, obstructs and modifies the data. 
Vulnerability  Non-secured transmission medium 
 Data is not being encrypted in the input interface and server 
Threat Agent An attacker with the ability to intercept the medium. 
Attack Method An attacker intercepts the transmission between the input interface and 
the server, obstructs and modifies the data. 
Risk Treatment-related Concepts 
Risk Treatment Risk reduction 
Security Requirement Make the transmitted data unreadable to third parties. 
Cross verify the received data with the data sent from the original source. 
Control Cryptographic algorithm 
Checksum algorithm 
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dependency between the two actors is modeled. In this instance the Submit Data plan is 
the dependum between the two actors, and two constrains indicate that a double dependency 
occurs. In order for the dependency to be fulfilled and the plan to be executed and both 
actors are required to equally contribute. 
 
Fig 4.2 - SRP1 Modelling of Business Assets 
Modeling the IS assets In Figure 4.3 we introduce the Transmission Medium actor 
that serves the purpose of transferring data from the Input Interface to the Server. Here the 
dependency between the Server and Input Interface is extended to include the Transmission 
Medium actor as well. Furthermore in this step the secure goal of Data integrity & 
confidentiality ensured is introduced satisfying the main constraints of the two actors. 
Moreover secure goals that are achieved by executing the secure plan of Ensure the 
integrity & confidentiality of the submitted data are introduced to satisfy the security 
constraints of both the Server and Input Interface actor. 
 
Fig 4.3 - SRP1 Modelling of IS Assets 
In Figure 4.4 we identify as main security threat a Man in the middle attack that 
impacts the security criterion of Confidentiality & integrity of the transmitted data. In 
Figure 4.5 we represent Submitted data obtained as main goal of the attacker that is 
satisfied by the Intercept transmission plan that attacks the Transfer the submitted data 
plan of the Transmission Medium actor exploiting the non-fulfilment of the secure plan 
Ensure the transmission is not intercepted. 
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Fig 4.4 - SRP1 Attack Identification 
 
Fig 4.5 - SRP1 Potential Attack Scenario 
In contemplation of the risks identified in the previous steps in Figure 3.6 we follow 
a risk reduction, risk treatment that mitigates those risks. We replace in both actors, the 
secure plan of the Ensure the integrity & confidentiality of the submitted data with the 
secure plan Perform cryptographic procedures and Perform checksum procedures. 
The replacements are performed in the according actor of the model. Here the dotted pattern 
of the constructs of each actor indicates, that they now all become security requirements that 
mitigate the Man in the Middle Attack. 
 
Fig 4.6 - SRP1 Risk Treatment and Security Requirements Definition 
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4.4 Summary 
In this chapter we provided an overview of the security pattern landscape. We 
introduced our pattern representation process using the security risk-oriented pattern 
template and RAST. Moreover we introduced SRP1 one of the five SRP’s that are part of 
this master thesis. 
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5 Security Risk-Oriented Patterns Used in Secure Tropos 
In the previous chapters we introduced RAST and our SRP representation 
methodology.  In this chapter we demonstrate in detail our pattern application process. In 
order to demonstrate our process we use a model extracted and adapted from (Yu, 1994). 
The selected model is an exempt from the designing phase of late requirements. The original 
modeling language used for the model is I*. We use the diagram from late requirements 
phase due to mainly one reason. In this phase, the system is introduced, making so that 
various interactions between the system and various actors can be identified. The pattern 
application process is as follows: Initially we search throughout the relevant literature and 
discover models relevant to this thesis. We pre-process the model in order to be compatible 
with RAST. We identify the occurrence of a pattern and extract all relevant assets to a new 
model. Then we introduce the various security mechanisms suggested by the SRP’s. Finally 
re-introduce the extracted back in the initial model.  
 
5.1 Model Pre-Processing 
For the purpose of demonstrating the application process we use a model from the 
relevant literature. The selected model is extracted from (Yu, 1994) (See Figure 5.1). The 
model depicts a meeting scheduler service that automates meeting scheduling between 
various participants. Using a model from the literature, serves the purpose of validating the 
applicability pattern application process. Using this model we demonstrate that the pattern 
application process, is applicable to a variety of scenarios. In this section we overview the 
process employed in converting the running example model from I* modeling to RAST. 
 
Fig 5.1 - Model for a computer-supported meeting scheduling configuration; adapted from (Yu, 1994) 
The pre-processing process initiates by removing all non-essential or related to 
RAST elements. The resulting model can be viewed in Figure 5.2. We remove all the 
softgoals to reduce confusion. In I* this construct is used to depict non-functional 
requirements. In RAST softgoals are mainly utilized to represent security criteria. Moreover 
we add additional goals (Meeting data stored/retrieved), and rename (Agreeable 
(Meeting, Date) to Date Agreed) to the Meeting Scheduler due to their importance 
regarding the security of the system. Additionally we decompose plans into resources 
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(Meeting Data, Date Data) that result from the employment of such plans from the 
meeting scheduler.  
Following the manipulation of softgoals, goals and resources an analyst in this phase 
can follow one of two courses of action. First one being to terminate the pre-processing and 
move to the next stage. Second and as performed in this concrete case, is to apply the first 
stage of RAST. Here we point out that the possibility of modeling multiple security criteria 
together in one construct, for a given goal/plan/resource/dependencies exists. This practice 
is encouraged due to serving the double function of, reducing the required space in the 
diagram and is more distinguishable.  
 
It is important to be noted that we do not apply security constraints to the whole 
model.  We instead apply them only to assets involved in the pattern application process in 
Section 5.2. This is done in order to reducing presentation complexity.  
 
Fig 5.2 - Meeting Scheduler Example without Security Constraints Applied 
5.2 Pattern Application Process 
In this section we present in detail our proposed pattern application process. The 
model used as a basis to demonstrate our process is the model in Figure 5.3. The depicted 
model, was pre-processed and will be used to demonstrate the process of applying pattern 
SRP1 illustrated in Chapter 4.  
 
STEP 1 - OCCURRENCE IDENTIFICATION & ASSET ALIGNMENT 
In this step we manually search within the given system and evaluate if a pattern is 
applicable to a given scenario. In the model of the Figure 5.1 we aim to apply SRP1 that we 
presented previously. Main goal of SRP1 is to secure communications between two actors 
from a “man in the middle” attack. As stated, initially we examine the model and determine 
if the assets of the model align to the assets of SRP1. After observing the model we extract 
the scenario where a participant enters a meeting date and that is transmitted to the meeting 
scheduler. We advance by evaluating the alignment of the individual components involved: 
 The Meeting Scheduler actor aligns to the Server actor of SRP1 given the 
similar interactions with the other actors. 
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 The Meeting Participant aligns to the Input Interface due to the connection 
to the Meeting Scheduler/Server. Given that a 1:1 occurrence not existing 
between SRP1 and the scenario under investigation, we assume that the 
Meeting Participant fulfils the Agree to Date plan by using an input 
interface provided by the Meeting Scheduler. This is why we rename the 
Meting Participant actor to Meeting Participant Interface. 
 As Transmission Medium we assume that such a structure exists in order 
to support the communication between the Meeting Participant and the 
Meeting Scheduler. 
Moreover in order for the desired pattern to be applicable, the type of dependency 
should match, namely a double dependency should exist. According to SRP1 the Input 
Interface relies on a transmission medium to transmit data to the Server. In order for the 
data to be transmitted and the plan of Submit data has to be completed. Similarly, we 
assume, that the Enter Available Dates plan follows a similar process. 
By making the previously mentioned aliments and assumptions, we ensure that the 
pattern is applicable to the model. Next we extract the portion of the model (see Figure 5.4) 
that corresponds SRP1. In the next steps we progressively place the matching security 
mechanisms in the assets suggested by the pattern.  
 
 
Fig 5.3 - Meeting Scheduler Running Example with Security Constraints and Criteria 
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Fig 5.4 - SRP1 occurrence in model 
STEP 2 - ASSET EXTRACTION & SECURE GOAL INTRODUCTION  
In this step we start by extracting the portion of the model relevant to the pattern. 
Depending on whether security criteria were identified in the pre-processing step or not. In 
this step vulnerable assets are identified and security criteria and constraints are introduced. 
Here additionally we introduce in the diagram the Date Data resource that is not present in 
the original model given its low granularity. We introduce the resource here because it is 
crucial for the representation of the scenario. The process follows closely the RAST 
methodology of separately illustrating business and IS Assets as seen in Figure 5.5, 5.6.  
Additionally in this instance we introduce the secure goals and secure plans suggested by 
the pattern (see Figure 5.6). The secure goals and plans are introduced to their aligned goals. 
 
 
Fig 5.5 - Pattern Application Example, STEP 2 (a) 
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Fig 5.6 - Pattern Application Example, STEP 2 (b) 
 
STEP 3 - SECURITY REQUIREMENT INTRODUCTION 
Following the identification of the secure goals and plans suggested by the pattern 
we introduce the security requirements (see Figure 5.7). These requirements satisfy the 
secure goals that were introduced in STEP 2. The introduction of a requirement is performed 
by replacing existing vulnerable asset in our case Ensure the integrity and confidentiality 
of the date data. The assets are replaced in this case by the security requirements suggested 
by SRP1 (Perform checksum procedures, Perform Cryptographic procedures). As illustrated 
in the diagram and suggested by SRP1 the introduction of these requirements results in the 
mitigation the threat “man in the middle attack”  
 
Fig 5.7 - Pattern Application Example, STEP 3 
STEP 4 - SECURITY REQUIREMENT RATIONALE & VALIDATION 
In this step using the diagram of Figure 5.8 we validate the newly introduced 
requirements. Here as the pattern suggests a “Man in the middle attack” is performed that 
attacks the transmission of the data. In case we apply the pattern and such an event does 
occur the date data will be encrypted and unusable to the attacker, additionally the event 
will be detected by the performance of the checksum algorithms, which will identify the 
occurrence and report it, so the breach will be detected and addressed accordingly. By 
observing the model we can see the direct impact of the non-employment of the previously 
stated security requirements, namely the Integrity and Confidentiality of the date data being 
compromised in the events of an attack. 
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Fig 5.8 - Pattern Application Example, STEP 4 
 
STEP 5 - MODEL INTEGRATION 
In this step the security requirements with the additional secure mechanisms are 
integrated back into the main model (see Figure 5.9). Here we outline the newly introduced 
assets for ease of detection. Moreover is important to note that the pattern application 
process same as the RAST process is of an iterative nature and when one application is 
concluded more iterations can be performed. 
 
Fig 5.9 - SRP1 Integrated in the Main Model 
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5.3 Other Patterns 
In this section we present all our proposed patterns applied to the meeting scheduler 
module. Given that the application process is illustrated in detail in the previous section. 
Here we present a brief overview of the process followed for each pattern. Additionally we 
overview all the security enhancement achieved. 
 
SRP2 - Securing business activities from submitted data 
SRP2 is relevant to our Meeting Scheduler example model due to its function to secure 
a business activity, against accepting and propagating malicious scripts. In this concrete 
scenario the meeting scheduler sends a proposed date to the meeting participant, and the 
participant responds with an agreement. In the extracted portion of Figure 5.10 we assume 
an existing possibility to attach an attachment along with the agreement, or sending a 
malicious agreement response exists. SRP2 introduces a filtering mechanism (see Figure 
5.11) that monitors the incoming data and rejects any type of document that doesn’t cope 
with the requirements, thus securing the system. In the concrete case of the scenario a 
filtering mechanism is in place making so only the desired data is passed to the meeting 
scheduler. 
 
 
Fig 5.10 - SRP2 Occurrence in the Meeting Scheduler Example 
 
 
Fig 5.11 - SRP2 Applied in the Meeting Scheduler Example 
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SRP3 - Securing business activities from DoS attacks 
SRP3 is applicable in the Meeting Scheduler actor due to the fact that the main 
function is to secure a system, against “denial of service” attacks. In the context of SRP3 
the attackers render the service unavailable by sending multiple requests to a service thus 
compromising its ability to respond to each and every one of them. Here SRP3 proposes the 
introduction of a mechanism that monitors the number of requests and if a fluxuation occurs 
the system detects the malicious occurrence and doesn’t respond to the malicious requests. 
In the extracted portion of Figure 5.12 of the scenario an attacker pretending to be a meeting 
initiator floods the meeting scheduler by sending multiple date ranges thus rendering the 
scheduler system unavailable for other users. By employing the security requirements 
suggested by SRP3 (see Figure 5.13) the meeting scheduler is able to monitor the requests 
and reject the malicious ones if that occurs. 
 
 
Fig 5.12 - SRP3 Occurrence in the Meeting Scheduler Example 
 
 
 
Fig 5.13 - SRP3 Applied in the Meeting Scheduler Example 
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SRP4 - Securing business data from unauthorized access 
SRP4 applies to the model from the literature due to the reason that secures a system, 
against attacks of unauthorized access of data and other information. In the context of SRP4 
the attackers taking advantage of no access control being in palace, accesses confidential 
business data that he is not authorized, causing perpetual harm to confidential information. 
Here SRP4 suggests the introduction of a mechanism that checks if a user that accesses 
certain information, has the appropriate clearance. In the concrete case of the meeting 
scheduler (see Figure 5.15), anyone using the meeting initiator interface has access to the 
meeting scheduler, can schedule a meeting thus compromising confidentiality of scheduled 
meetings. By employing the SRP4 suggested security requirements  (see Figure 5.15) the 
meeting initiator interface is able to at first confirm if a user has the appropriate clearance 
to access a meeting information and then provides accordingly access or not. 
 
 
Fig 5.14 - SRP4 Occurrence in the Meeting Scheduler Example 
 
 
 
Fig 5.15 - SRP4 Applied in the Meeting Scheduler Example 
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SRP5 - Securing business data stored/retrieved from a data store  
SRP5 is applicable in this scenario due to the main property to secure a system, 
against access of data that is stored in plaintext. In the context of SRP5 the attackers taking 
advantage that the data is being stored in plaintext, accesses, reads and obstructs it form the 
data store. Here SRP5 suggests the introduction of a mechanism that encrypts the data before 
it is stored in the data store thus rendering it illegible. Moreover if a request for accessing 
the data is perform the data is decrypted and thus delivered in a legible state. In the concrete 
case (see Figure 5.16) of the scenario as-is, any information regarding meetings is stored 
without any explicit encryption thus being vulnerable to attacks. By employing the SRP5 
requirements (see Figure 5.17) the meeting scheduler is able to accordingly encrypt and 
decrypt any meeting data making it safe against attacks mentioned above. 
 
Fig 5.16 - SRP5 Occurrence in the Meeting Scheduler Example 
 
 
Fig 5.17 - SRP5 Applied in the Meeting Scheduler Example 
40 
 
The model with all the patterns discussed in this thesis applied can be seen in Figure 
5.18. In this point we can observe the level of granularity that RAST introduces, making so 
that the entire system security can be overview by one single diagram. Nonetheless is 
important to mention that one of the major drawbacks of RAST is that the models/diagrams 
grow large in a very quick and this one of the issues to be tackle in future works. 
 
 
Fig 5.18 - The Entire Model with All the Patterns Applied 
 
5.4 Further Steps 
Following the completion of the application process of the patterns, a further suggested 
step would be to remove all the security constrains and criteria from the model in order to 
provide a clearer view of the system at hand. Moreover although it is outside the scope of 
this thesis, a trade-off analysis should be performed in order to select the most effective 
controls in terms of security and cost required for their implementation. Not all the 
requirements and controls introduced by the patterns are mandatory to be implemented 
within the system. We suggest following the process described in (Mayer 2009) where 
metrics are derived through the GQM method and costs are estimated through the ROSI 
concept in order to priorities and select the best course of action. 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter we presented our pattern application process using SRP1. Moreover we 
briefly described the results of applying the rest of our proposed patterns. Finally we provide 
a brief description of further steps that can be taken after the completion of the pattern 
application process. 
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6 Validation 
This chapter demonstrates the process followed in order to validate the proposed 
patterns and usability of the pattern application process. All participants of the case study 
were individuals with a software engineering background. Participants were required to 
undergo a small training regarding ISSRM, RAST, the proposed patterns expressed in 
RAST and the proposed pattern application process. Following the training, the participants 
were given a task involving the application of our proposed patterns, expressed in RAST 
into a model. Finally, a questionnaire was filled in order to assess the usability of the overall 
process. Moreover, the time required for the completion of the process by a participant was 
over three hours. 
 
6.1 Case Study Questions 
We consider the following questions: 
CSQ1. What is the correctness of the pattern applicability by the participant? 
CSQ2. How understandable is the pattern application process for participants  
  with a ISSRM background vs. participants without a ISSRM background? 
CSQ3. What is the usability of the pattern application process? 
 
6.2 Introductory Lecture 
In the beginning of the case study, we delivered an introductory lecture of the involved 
concepts. In this lecture we introduced the participants with the core concepts of the ISSRM 
domain model in addition to the risk management process. We continued with the 
introduction of the core concepts of RAST, giving an appropriate overview and an example 
of it. As an example for demonstrating RAST, we utilised the running example illustrated 
in the second chapter of the thesis.  Additionally we provided a brief description of our 
representation of SRP1. The lecture was concluded with the demonstration of the pattern 
application of SRP1 to the model of chapter 5. 
 
6.3 Pattern Application Task 
After the introductory lecture, the participants were required to perform a task. The 
task focused mainly on the pattern application process described in Chapter 5. Participants 
were given a model described in Section 6.4 and were required to identify a pattern 
occurrence as well as apply the pattern. Participants were also given additional materials 
which included our pattern representations of the SRP’s as well as the pattern application 
chapter of this thesis. 
 
6.4 Case Study Model 
Following the introductory lecture the participants were required to apply our 
proposed patterns to a model from the literature. The model was selected on the basis of two 
main criteria: ease of understanding and applicability of the patterns. The model of Figure 
6.1 adapted from (Altuhhova, 2013) with the minor interventions fulfils both this two 
criteria. The model is of an internet store where a user registers to the service and his data 
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is processed accordingly. Important to enhance that the model does not include security 
criteria, constraints, goals or plans. 
 
Fig 6.1 - Internet Store Registration; adapted from (Altuhhova, 2013) 
 
6.5 Case Study Questionnaire 
The questions of our questionnaire are focused on the usability of the RAST process, 
SRP’s and pattern application process. The questions regarding RAST are included as an 
additional indicator of how the RAST process affects the overall process of presenting and 
applying an SRP. Questions aimed on determining how RAST affects the overall process 
evaluated the easiness and understandability of the process. Questions directed towards 
determining the usability of the individual patterns (without being applied) evaluated the 
easiness, satisfaction and understandability of the process. Questions aimed at determining 
the usability of the pattern application process evaluated easiness, satisfaction and 
understandability of the overall process. The individual answers from each participant in the 
case study can be found in the Appendix 
 
6.6 Case Study Participants 
We divided the participants of this case study into two main groups, GROUP A and 
GROUP B. In GROUP A we included participants with an IS-security background, who are 
working in the field of enterprise security and have prior knowledge of the ISSRM concepts. 
In GROUP B we included participants with a non-IS-security background, who have a 
software engineering background but lack knowledge regarding ISSRM concepts. The 
establishment of two groups was necessary to determine, how no prior knowledge of the 
topic affects the overall results. Individual background regarding each participant can be 
viewed in the Appendix. Given that each study required a considerable amount of time to 
be completed, the participants did not perform the pattern application process for all the 
patterns proposed in this work. The patterns applied by each participant can be viewed in 
Table 4. In this instance and the rest of the work we refer to the participants by a designated 
letter Participant A is referred as PA, Participant B is referred as PB and so on. PA, PB and 
PC belong to GROUP A. PD, PF and PE belong to GROUP B. 
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Table 4 - Patterns Applied by Each Study Participant 
  SRP1 SRP2 SRP3 SRP4 SRP5 
G
R
O
U
P
 A
 PA 
 PB 
PC 
G
R
O
U
P
 B
 PD 
PE 
PF 
 
6.7 Threats to Validity 
In this section we describe what we consider to be threats to our validation process. 
 The number of participants in the study is rather small (six participants) thus the 
sample may not be accurate. Making so that the results might differ if a larger 
number of participants are part of the study. 
 The two different groups of participants involved in the case study were divided by 
generalising the participant’s background. This was due to lack of participant with 
identical backgrounds. Selecting participants with identical backgrounds could 
influence the results of the study.  
 Throughout the process of the study, participants received assistance. Questions 
regarding the process and other related matters were answered while performing the 
various tasks. It is estimated that in case the participant would not be assisted during 
the study results would differ. 
 The conduction of each process required roughly three hours from the beginning to 
the end. Moreover, it was performed in various uncontrolled environments. 
Performing the study in a shorter or longer amount of time would have an impact on 
the results. In addition conducting the study in controlled environment would as well 
impact the results. 
 Each of the different case studies were conducted separately. The participants were 
isolated from each other and the process was performed separately. If the study were 
to call for all the participant to participate in the study the results might differ due to 
participant cooperating or sharing or non-disclosing information between them. 
 Each participant applied a different pattern. Ideally, all of the participants would 
have to complete all the patters for better results. 
 Each participant had a different level of information retention from the case study 
lecture. No measure was implemented to reassure the level of retention. The 
implementation of such measure would result in all the participants having the same 
information retention. Thus the results would be more reliable. 
 Participants had a varying level of prior knowledge of the concepts of ISSRM. 
Having participants with the same levels of ISSRM background knowledge would 
deliver more reliable result. 
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 The majority of the participants implemented the models using an online drawing 
tool. Implementing the models by hand or other method could impact the results of 
the process. Depending on the method the participants could deliver less accurate 
models or the opposite. 
 The participants were not told that they were expected to perform in a certain way 
or that a specific result was expected from them. Stating expectations upfront would 
impact the overall performance pf the participants. The performance could be 
enhance in case the participant would want to perform according the expectations. 
Or the participant could suffer from a type of performance anxiety and his result 
would be negatively affected. 
 Participant had prior acquaintance with the conductor of the case study and author 
of the thesis. If no prior acquaintance would occur participants could not ask the 
same questions or perform in the same manner they would perform to another 
individual.  
 A number of patterns were easier to be identified in the model comparatively to other 
patterns that were less obvious. If all the pattern would be identical in terms of 
identification ease the result would differ. Making a pattern easier or harder to 
identify results in the pattern application process becoming automatically easier of 
harder to be performed. 
All the above factors had a high level of contribution to the overall results of the case 
study. We assume that in case of a more extensive study with a greater number of 
participants and different separation different results might be produced from the study. 
 
6.8 Individual Participant Task Results 
In this section we overview the results regarding the correctness of the tasks 
performed by the case study participants. Detailed reports for each of the participant’s 
results can be found in section VI of the Appendix.  
The correctness of each application is measured regarding the errors that were 
performed during the process. Hereby lower numbers denote higher correctness and vice 
versa. Errors are divided in two categories Phrasing and Modelling errors. Phrasing errors 
describe any error in regards to the phrasing of any of the components (e.g. labels in goals, 
plans, etc.) of the model. Modelling errors describe errors in regards to errors performed in 
the modelling of each asset of a model. Modelling errors include using wrong, linking 
between assets, dependency and asset modelling. Additionally as modelling mistakes are 
considered wrong colouring of the constructs. In order to determine a standard for measuring 
correctness we compare each of the models of the participants to the correct models depicted 
in section VII of the Appendix. 
 In Table 5 we overview the number of errors each participant performed. Comparing 
the total errors we can observe that PB made the least amount of errors compared to the 
other participants. Important is to point out that the errors of PA were minor in comparison 
to phrasing errors of the other participants. Thus if we were to overlook them PA would 
have no errors for the application of SRP2. Overall it is observed that the majority of the 
errors that the participants performed were phrasing errors. This is attributed to the non-
existence of clear definitions in regards to phrasing. 
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Table 5 - Case Study Participant Pattern Application Errors 
 Phrasing Errors Modelling Errors Total 
PA (SRP2) 20* 0 20* 
PA (SRP4) -*2 -*2 -*2 
 B (SRP5) 0 4 4 
PC (SRP1) 11 0 11 
PC (SRP3) 16 0 16 
PD (SRP4) 11 0 11 
PE (SRP1) 26 13 39 
PF (SRP2) 10 0 10 
*   Minor Mistakes 
*2   Not Eligible for error counting due to the participant not using an existing construct but assumed 
that the system includes the functionality. 
 
6.9 Case Study Group Comparative Discussion  
GROUP A participants were able to apply and fully comprehend the described 
patterns as well as the pattern application process. GROUP B participants able to apply and 
moderately comprehend the patterns described in this work. GROUP A participants 
followed correctly all the pattern application steps described in the application process. 
Nonetheless mistakes were made in phrasing and resource decomposition. Moreover, they 
performed all the tasks given in a reasonable time frame and were confident in their results. 
GROUP B participants completed the pattern application process with moderate 
correctness. Similar to the participants of GROUP A, GROUP B made mistakes in phrasing 
and modeling. Furthermore, noticeable difference in the results was the level of confidence 
in the results of the application process. Participants of GROUP B were notably less 
confident than the participants of Group A in their results. Important to point out that the IS 
security background of these participants had a small impact to the overall results. 
 
6.10 Questionnaire Summary of the Results 
In this section we summarise the answers the participant gave to the questionnaire 
received after the completion of the study. All the questions required from the participants 
to answer on one of the different levels of ease, understandability and satisfaction. Namely 
the questions were separated in:  
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Not at all, Slightly, Moderate and Very…easy/understandable/satisfied. 
With ‘Not at all’ being the lowest and ‘Very’ being the highest possible mark. The answers 
to the questionnaire in detail can be found in section VIII of the Appendix. 
 The majority of the participants found that the RAST application process is 
moderately easy. (see Question 1 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 The participants of GROUP A found the RAST application process moderately 
understandable whereas participants of GROUP B found it slightly understandable. 
(see Question 2 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 The majority of participants found the patterns expressed in RAST moderately 
easy to learn. (see Question 3 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 The majority of the participants of GROUP A were very satisfied with the RAST 
patterns overall whereas participants of GROUP B were moderately satisfied. (see 
Question 4 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 The majority of participants found the patterns expressed in RAST moderately 
understandable. (see Question 5 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 All the participants of GROUP A found the pre-processing of a given model 
moderately easy whereas participants of GROUP B found it slightly easy. (see 
Question 6 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 The majority of the participants in both groups found identifying 
goals/plans/resources/dependencies that are under risk moderately easy. (see 
Question 7 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 Overall the participants of both groups found applying constraints and security 
criteria to goals/plans/resources/dependencies moderately easy. (see Question 8 of 
section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 Overall the participants of both groups found the identification of where a pattern 
is applicable moderately easy. (see Question 9 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 The majority of the participants of GROUP A found extracting the assets involved 
in a pattern from the main model, moderately easy whereas participants of GROUP 
B found it slightly easy. (see Question 10 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 Overall the majority of the participants of both groups stated that replicating and 
adjusting a pattern to a previously unknown model moderately easy. (see Question 
11 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 The majority of the participants of GROUP A found identifying and applying 
secure goals to the assets of an actor slightly easy whereas participants of GROUP 
B found it moderately easy. (see Question 12 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 The majority of the participants found replacing secure goals with the controls 
suggested by a pattern moderately easy. (see Question 13 of section VIII in the 
Appendix ) 
 The majority of the participants found re-integrating the previously isolated portion 
of the main model with the security requirements applied moderately easy to be 
performed. (see Question 14 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 Participants of GROUP A found the security requirement introduction and re-
integration of an extracted model step of the pattern application process as the 
hardest to perform whereas participants of GROUP B found occurrence 
identification, re-integration of an extracted model and security requirement 
introduction as the hardest. (see Question 15 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
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 Participants of GROUP A found the occurrence identification step of the pattern 
application process as the easiest to perform whereas participants of GROUP B 
found occurrence identification and asset extraction and secure goal introduction as 
the easiest. (see Question 16 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 The majority of the participants found the pattern application process to be 
moderately easy to learn overall. (see Question 17 of section VIII in the Appendix) 
 The majority of the participants found the pattern application process to be 
moderately easy. (see Question 18 of section VIII in the Appendix) 
 The majority of the participants found the pattern application process to be 
moderately efficient. (see Question 19 of section VIII in the Appendix) 
 The majority of the participants found the pattern application process to be 
moderately understandable. (see Question 20 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 The majority of the participants of GROUP A were moderately satisfied but the 
overall process whereas participants of GROUP B  were slightly satisfied. (see 
Question 21 of section VIII in the Appendix ) 
 
6.11 Case Study Concluding Remarks 
Contemplating on the results of the pattern application process and the questionnaire results 
the following conclusions were achieved: 
 The proposed pattern representation was, understood by all the participants.  
 All participants involved in the case study completed the application of at least one 
pattern. Mistakes were observed in the phrasing and modeling of various assets of 
the models. In comparison less mistakes were made in modeling rather than 
phrasing. 
 The fact that both groups were able to complete the tasks assigned, demonstrated 
that the process is useable as a starting point to elicit security requirements in a goal-
oriented environment. 
 The easiest part in the application process according to the majority of the 
participants was the pattern identification and asset alignment. 
 The hardest step to be applied by the majority of the participants was security 
requirement introduction and extracted model re-integration. 
 The pattern application process was according to the majority of the participants 
moderately easy to be applied. 
 Having a background knowledge in IS security affects the process during the first 
applications.  
 Having a background knowledge in IS speeds up moderately the process. 
 Prior knowledge of an agent oriented language in combination ISSRM affects in 
moderation the overall results. Participant that had no prior knowledge were less 
confident about their results. 
 RAST affects the overall process in a moderate level. We attribute the difficulties 
the participants faced during the security requirement introduction step to RAST. 
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6.12 Answers to the Case Study Questions 
CSQ1: Overall the results were satisfactory. All the participants completed the 
application process. The process was overall followed semi-correctly with the main 
mistakes being made in the phrasing of the constructs. 
CSQ2: The results of the case study demonstrated that the process is considerably 
more understandable to the participants of GROUP A comparatively to GROUP B. Overall 
the participants of GROUP A fully understood the process. GROUP B participants 
understood the process but had difficulties in the application of it. In some cases GROUP B 
participants would mechanically perform the steps without comprehending the purpose.  
CSQ3: Overall the application process was found to be more usable by GROUP A 
than GROUP B. GROUP A participants found moderately usable the process whereas 
GROUP B participants found it slightly usable. 
 
6.13 Summary 
In this chapter, we outlined the process we followed in order to validate the contribution 
part of this master thesis. Initially we present the questions that guided the case study. We 
briefly summarized the introductory lecture as well as the task to be performed by the 
participants. Furthermore the model used in the case study was overviewed. Additionally 
we described the questionnaire to be filled by the participants. Moreover we provided with 
a brief description of the two groups of participants involved in our case study. The threats 
to validity were presented in addition to the results of the tasks performed and the answers 
to the questionnaire. Finally, we presented the questionnaire results, the validation process 
results and answer the questions posed by the case study. 
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7 Conclusion 
In the beginning of this master thesis we presented our motivation, scope and research 
question. We followed with a brief overview of ISSRM that is the core security risk 
management framework of this thesis. Moreover we described various goal-oriented 
modeling languages as well as provided rationale for using RAST as main modeling 
language of this study.  Furthermore we examined security patterns and introduced an 
approach for presenting an SRP in a goal oriented environment. We followed by presenting 
our illustrated SRP’s in addition to introducing our pattern application process in order to 
apply a pattern to a given model. Additionally we presented with the process followed to 
validate the contributions of this thesis. In this concluding chapter we answer our research 
question with additional remarks. Finally we present our suggestions for future work. 
 
7.1 Related Work 
In (Naved, 2015) Naved presents Security Requirement Elicitation from Business 
Processes (SREBP) methodology that enables security requirements elicitation from 
Business Process Models using SRP’s. Similar to the process of this master thesis the 
methodology proposed by SREBP identifies risks and addresses them using SRP’s. The 
fundamental differences between the two works stand in methodology input, specialist 
cooperation and overall framework. The methodology introduced by Naved requires as an 
input the Value Chain and Business Process Model whereas our methodology requires a 
model from the late requirements design phase of RAST. The proposed process by SREBP 
requires the cooperation between security analysts whereas the methodology proposed in 
this master thesis requires a system analyst and optionally a security analyst. Moreover the 
two process differ in the overall perspective, SREBP focuses on process whereas this thesis 
focuses in the goals of a system. 
 
7.2 Answer to Research Question & Conclusions 
RQ:  How  to  integrate  security  risk-oriented  patterns  in  the  goal-oriented  
information  system development? 
ANSWER: Integrating security risk-oriented patterns in the goal-oriented 
information system development is a threefold procedure. Initially one has to clearly define 
and describe a pattern. Following step is the identification of a pattern occurrence. Final step 
is introduction of the security mechanisms suggested by the pattern. In this work we 
presented with a pattern presentation structure as well as the application process. We 
describe a pattern by combining a security risk-oriented pattern template in addition to the 
modeling process of RAST. Additionally we present with an application process to be 
followed in order to apply the patterns into a goal oriented scenario. Our pattern application 
process covers the pre-processing of a given model. The method of identifying the 
occurrence of a pattern followed by the extraction of all relevant assets to a new model. 
Moreover describes the process of introducing the various security mechanisms suggested 
by the SRP’s. Finally provides guidance for re-introducing the extracted assets back in the 
initial model. The contributed portion of this study was validated regarding its overall 
usability through the conduction of a case study. The results of the case study affirmed the 
usability of our pattern representation as well as the application process. Finally the results 
demonstrated that our proposed SRP’s and pattern application process is usable as a starting 
point for more efficient identification of security requirements. 
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7.3 Limitations 
Limitations of this work are: 
 The scope of this master thesis excludes cost estimation for each security 
requirement and subsequent control. This limited the overall process into not 
including a mechanism that is utilised for evaluating costs. Subsequently this leads 
in no method existing in order to evaluate the costs-effectivity of controls.  
 We illustrate only five patterns in this master thesis. Subsequently not all the types 
of risks that a system is faced with cannot be considered. 
 All the SRP’s are applied and modelled manually. This results in a number of 
possible errors occurring during the process. In particular the pattern occurrence 
identification is one of the steps involved that includes a number of sub steps. In 
order for all these steps to be executed critical thinking in addition to observational 
skills are required. 
 Security Risk Aware Secure Tropos is a fairly new modelling procedure. This results 
in limited amounts of resources available. Subsequently related research is also 
limited and the amounts of models available in order to validate the process is small. 
 
7.4 Future Work 
We suggest that further work should mainly target the overall completion of the 
pattern application process using RAST. This would include the measurement of the 
effectivity of each suggested security requirement. In addition to the inclusion of a 
mechanism that would provide cost estimation metrics for each control. These two 
previously mentioned mechanisms in conjunction would provide with a basic trade off 
analysis between security and costs. Additionally the implementation of a software tool that 
would support the pattern application process would speed up considerably the overall 
process. Finally the representation of more patterns is crucial. Including more pattern would 
result in more risks and vulnerabilities to be identified. Subsequently this would enhance 
the resulting security of every system or scenario the process is applied. 
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Appendix 
I. Abstract Syntax of RAST 
In this section we overview the abstract syntax of RAST (Matulevičius et al., 2012). 
The syntax includes two different meta-models the Security Enhanced Actor Model 
(SEAM) and Security Enhance Goal Model (SEGM). 
The core of SEAM (see Figure 8.1) is an actor. An actor can be part of a dependency 
either as a depender ore a dependee. Security constraints represent security related 
constraints that are imposed to the hardgoals, resources or plans of an actor. A security 
constraint contains within one or more secure dependencies. The introduction of a secure 
dependency renders a security constraint(s) valid. Secure dependencies can be distinguished 
into three main core types: dependee secure dependency, deepener secure and a double 
secure dependency. 
 
Fig 8.1 - SEAM Abstract Syntax; adapted from (Matulevičius et al., 2012) 
Core of SEGM (see Figure 8.2) is an actor. An actor executes plans uses resources 
and goals. All the concepts that an actor makes use of can be decomposed further. Plans can 
be further decomposed into additional plans, resources or can be converted into hardgoals. 
The achievement of secure is performed through a means-ends relationship. In order to 
satisfy a softgoal a contribution should be imposed on other softgoals, resources plans or 
hardgoals. 
 
Fig 8.2 - SEGM Abstract Syntax; adapted from (Matulevičius et al., 2012) 
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Moreover a syntax for security constraint and threat is introduced Figure 8.3. A 
security constraint is imposed onto an actor and mainly functions by restricting the execution 
of plans, resource availability and hardgoals achieved by an actor. Secure goals introduce 
strategic security interest of an actor. The “satisfies” relationship is used to fulfil a security 
constraint by a secure goal. A secure plan constitutes of a plan that is devoted to the 
satisfaction of a secure goal. Secure resources represent security critical entities within the 
context of the system. Security constraint result in lowering the impact of threat towards 
plans, resources and hardgoals. Furthermore security constraints can be used to restrict plans 
resources and hardgoals. 
 
Fig 8.3 - Abstract Syntax of Security Constraint and Threat; adapted from (Matulevičius et al., 2012) 
Security attack scenarios (see Figure 8.4) syntax is also addressed and introduced by 
RAST. It is used to distinguish between assets that are part of the system and malicious 
actors. This syntax introduces the attacker attribute to the actor. In this context the actor is 
represented as an attacker if the attribute is set to true.  Subsequently an attacker executes a 
plan that either exploits a target or attacks a resource. 
 
Fig 8.4 - Abstract Syntax of Security Attack Scenario; adapted from (Matulevičius et al., 2012) 
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II. SRP2 - Securing business activities from submitted data 
SRP2 (Ahmed & Matulevičius 2014), enables validation of data submitted to a business 
activity, by predicting the need for a mechanism, that scans and detects malicious data 
before the data is forwarded to a business activity. This pattern counters an attacker that has 
information regarding the systems inner functionalities, and has the intention to harm the 
system. The malicious agent attacks by submitting through the input interface a malicious 
script that exploits the fact that incoming data are not filtered. The attack leads at the loss of 
confidentiality and the integrity of the business activity that is forwarded to. In Table 6 we 
utilise the security risk oriented pattern template in order to represent a detailed overview 
of the pattern and move forward with the representation of the pattern using RAST. 
Table 6 - SRP2 Asset Identification and Mitigation 
 
In Figure 8.5 we identify as the business asset the respective business activity where 
the data is submitted, that is represented by the goal Data submitted to respective 
business activity that is achieved by the plan of Submit the data to respective business 
activity. As IS asset we identify the Input interface that is represented by an actor diagram 
that includes the respective assets. Moreover, we identify as security criterion the 
confidentiality and integrity of the data, which is represented by a softgoal that has a positive 
contribution by the security constraint of Maintain the confidentiality & integrity of the 
Security scenario & security context identification 
Pattern Name Securing business activities from submitted data 
Pattern Decision This pattern validates data entry into a business IS by detecting malicious 
data. 
Asset-related Concepts 
Business Asset The respective business activity to which data is submitted. 
IS Asset The input interface. 
Security Criterion Confidentiality of the business activity. 
Integrity of the business activity. 
Risk-related Concepts 
Risk An attacker with the knowledge of the systems inner functionalities and 
intending to harm the business activity, submits through the input inter-
face a malicious script exploiting the fact that incoming data are not fil-
tered. Leading to the loss of the confidentiality and the integrity of the 
business activity where the data is submitted.  
Impact  Loss of the confidentiality of the business activity. 
 Loss of the integrity of the business activity. 
 Perpetual damage the malicious script can cause. 
Event An attacker intending to harm the business activity, submits through the 
input interface a malicious script exploiting that there is no screening pro-
cess for the data. 
Threat An attacker with the knowledge of the systems inner functionalities and 
wanting harm the business activity submits through impute interface a 
malicious script. 
Vulnerability The incoming data to the business activity is not filtered. 
Threat Agent An attacker intending to harm/corrupt a business activity. 
Attack Method An attacker submits through impute interface a malicious script 
Risk Treatment-related Concepts 
Risk Treatment Risk reduction 
Security Requirement Check data for malicious content before submitting it to a business activ-
ity. 
Control Input data scanning mechanism - scans inputted data and blocks or iso-
lates data flagged as harmful. 
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business activity. This constraint restricts the previously mentioned plan that assists in the 
achievement of the goal of the Input interface actor. In Figure 8.6 we introduce a secure goal 
of Confidentiality and integrity of the business activity ensured that satisfies the main 
security constraint of the actor. This secure goal is achieved by completing the secure plan 
of (S) Ensure data confidentiality and integrity of the business activity. 
 
Fig 8.5 - SRP2 Modelling of Business Assets 
 
Fig 8.6 - SRP2 Modelling of IS Assets 
In the event of an attack in Figure 8.7 we identify as a threat Submit malicious 
script that has an impact on the security criterion of Confidentiality & integrity resulting in 
harm. In Figure 8.8 we represent the potential attack scenario of an Attacker actor that 
having as main malicious goal Business Activity Harmed executes the malicious plan of 
Submit malicious script that attacks the plan Submit the data to respective business 
activity of the input interface actor. The malicious plan of the attacker exploits the non-
fulfilment of the Ensure data confidentiality and integrity secure plan. 
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Fig 8.7 - SRP2 Attack Identification 
 
Fig 8.8 - SRP2 Potential Attack Scenario 
In order to counter the identified risks SRP2 in Figure 8.9 introduces a filtering 
mechanism that scans the data to be submitted to a business activity and rejects or isolates 
any malicious data. Here we replace the secure plan of Ensure data confidentiality and 
integrity with Filter Incoming Data that is represented with a dotted pattern indicating that 
is along with the secure goal and constraint a security requirement. 
 
Fig 8.9 - SRP2 Risk Treatment and Security Requirements Definition 
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III. SRP3 - Securing business activities from DoS attacks 
SRP3 (Ahmed & Matulevičius 2014), ensures the availability of a service in the event 
of a Denial of Service Attack (Dos). This pattern counters the actions of an attack, where 
due to an unlimited amount of request being forwarded to the server, a business service is 
rendered unresponsive. The attackers send an exponentially growing number of 
simultaneous requests to the system, resulting in the system crashing due to its ability to 
only serve a certain number of simultaneous clients. The attack leads to the loss of the 
availability of the service to the respective clients of the system and server functionality to 
be damaged. In Table 7 we utilise the security risk oriented pattern template in order to 
represent a detailed overview of the pattern and move forward with the representation of the 
pattern using RAST. 
Table 7 - SRP3 Asset Identification and Mitigation 
 
In Figure 8.10 we identify as the business asset the provided service, which is rep-
resented by the goal Service provided that is achieved by the plan of Provide Service, 
which relies on the plan of Listen for requests. As IS asset we identify the Server that is 
represented by an actor diagram. Moreover, we identify as security criterion the Availability 
Security scenario & security context identification 
Pattern Name Securing business activities from DoS attacks 
Pattern Decision This pattern ensures the availability of a service faced with a Denial of 
Service Attack. 
Asset-related Concepts 
Business Asset The provided business service. 
IS Asset Server 
Security Criterion Availability of the business service. 
Risk-related Concepts 
Risk An attacker with the knowledge of the systems inner functionalities and 
due to unlimited request being allowed by the system, sends multiple re-
quests to the system simultaneously causing the system to not be non-
responsive. Leading to the loss of the availability of the service and server 
functionality to be damaged. 
Impact  Loss of the availability of the service. 
 Damaged server functionally. 
 Perpetual business reputation damage. 
Event An attacker able to perform a DoS attack and due to unlimited request 
being allowed by the system, sends multiple requests to the system sim-
ultaneously causing the system to not be responsive. 
Threat An attacker with the knowledge of the systems inner functionalities sends 
multiple requests to the system simultaneously causing the system to not 
be responsive. 
Vulnerability Unlimited number of requests is allowed to be performed 
Threat Agent An attacker with the knowledge of the systems inner functionalities 
Attack Method An attacker sends multiple requests to the system simultaneously causing 
the system to not be responsive. 
Risk Treatment-related Concepts 
Risk Treatment Risk reduction 
Security Requirement Check incoming requests.  
Perform a classification of the incoming requests. 
Discard data classified as harmful. 
Control Abnormal incoming request classifier. 
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of the provided business service, which is represented by a softgoal that has a positive con-
tribution by the security constraint of Maintain the availability of the provided service. 
This constraint restricts the previously mentioned goal of the Server actor. In Figure 8.11 
we introduce a secure goal of Availability of the provided service ensured that satisfies 
the main security constraint of the actor. This secure goal is achieved by completing the 
secure plan of Ensure provided service availability. 
 
 
Fig 8.10 - SRP3 Modelling of Business Assets 
 
Fig 8.11 - SRP3 Modelling of IS Assets 
 
In case of an attack in Figure 8.12 we identify as a threat DOS attack that has an 
impact on the security criterion of Availability, resulting in harm. In Figure 8.13 we 
represent the potential attack scenario of an Attacker actor that having as main malicious 
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goal Service rendered unavailable executes the malicious plan of Flood the service 
with requests that attacks the plan Listen for requests of the Server actor. The malicious 
plan of the attacker exploits the non-fulfilment of the Ensure provided service availability 
secure plan. 
 
Fig 8.12 - SRP3 Attack Identification  
 
Fig 8.13 - SRP3 Potential Attack Scenario 
Addressing the identified risks SRP2 in Figure 8.14 introduces checker for abnormal 
requests that discards them in the event of an anomaly. Here we replace the secure plan of 
Ensure provided service availability with Check for abnormal requests that is 
represented with a dotted pattern indicating that is along with the secure goal and security 
constraint a security requirement. 
 
Fig 8.14 - SRP3 Risk Treatment and Security Requirements Definition 
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IV. SRP4 - Securing business data from unauthorized access 
SRP4 (Ahmed & Matulevičius 2014), is focused the process of securing confidential 
information, from being accessed by unauthorised devices or people. The scenario that this 
pattern counters is of an attacker that gains access to sensitive business data through a 
commonly used retrieval interface. Due to the interface not incorporating an access control 
mechanism the malicious agent is able to retrieve the data. The attack leads in the 
compromise of the confidentiality of the business data that is compromised. In Table 8 we 
utilise the security risk oriented pattern template in order to represent a detailed overview 
of the pattern and move forward with the representation of the pattern using RAST. 
Table 8 - SRP4 Asset Identification and Mitigation 
 
In Figure 8.15 we identify as the business asset the Data that is retrieved, and 
represented as a resource that is decomposed from the plan Retrieve data, which satisfies 
the main goal of the IS asset of the model the Retrieval interface actor, main goal of this 
actor being Data retrieved. Furthermore in this instance we identify as security criterion 
the Confidentiality of the retrieved business data, which is represented by a softgoal that 
has a positive contribution by the security constraint of Maintain data confidentiality. This 
constraint restricts the previously mentioned goal that assists in the achievement of the goal 
of the Retrieval interface actor. In Figure 8.16 we introduce a secure goal of Confidentiality 
Security scenario & security context identification 
Pattern Name Securing business data from unauthorized access. 
Pattern Decision This pattern describes the process of securing confidential information, 
from being accessed by unauthorized devices or people. 
Asset-related Concepts 
Business Asset Requested data 
IS Asset Retrieval interface 
Security Criterion Confidentiality of the data. 
Risk-related Concepts 
Risk 
 
An attacker accesses data through the retrieval interface and due to the 
interface not having an access control mechanism he is able to retrieve 
data. The confidentiality of the data is compromised due to the privileges 
a client has, to access the retrieval interface - which displays the data with-
out requiring for authorization. 
Impact  Loss of the confidentiality of the data. 
 Retrieval interface becomes prone to future attacks. 
 Further distribution of the data that harms the business. 
Event An attacker accesses data through the retrieval interface and due to the 
interface not having an access control mechanism is able to retrieve con-
fidential business data. 
Threat An attacker accesses data through the retrieval interface and is able to 
retrieve confidential business data. 
Vulnerability Access control mechanism that grants access given a security clearance is 
not employed.  
Threat Agent An attacker unauthorized to access the retrieval interface. 
Attack Method The attacker accesses the retrieval interface. 
Risk Treatment-related Concepts 
Risk Treatment Risk reduction 
Security Requirement Check user access rights. 
Provide access only if the access rights of the user, match the access rights 
of the file. 
Control User access rights checker. 
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of data ensured that satisfies the main security constraint of the actor. This secure goal is 
achieved by completing the secure plan of Ensure the confidentiality of the data. 
 
Fig 8.15 - SRP4 Modelling of Business Assets 
 
Fig 8.16 - SRP4 Modelling of IS Assets 
In case of an attack in Figure 8.17 we identify as a threat Unauthorised access that 
has an impact on the security criterion of Confidentiality resulting in harm. In Figure 8.18 
we represent the potential attack scenario of an Attacker actor that having as main malicious 
goal Data Obtained that executes the malicious plan of Access the data that attacks the 
plan Retrieve data of the Retrieval Interface actor. The malicious plan of the attacker ex-
ploits the non-fulfilment of the Ensure the confidentiality of the data secure plan. 
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Fig 8.17 - SRP4 Attack Identification  
 
Fig 8.18 - SRP4 Potential Attack Scenario 
Countering the risks identified SRP4 in Figure 8.19 introduces an access check 
mechanism that requires the clearance level of each client to be checked before data is re-
trieved. Here we replace the secure plan of Ensure confidentiality of the data with Check 
access rights that is represented with a dotted pattern indicating that is along with the 
secure goal and constraint are security requirement. 
 
Fig 8.19 - SRP4 Risk Treatment and Security Requirements Definition 
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V. SRP5 - Securing business data stored/retrieved from a data store 
SRP5 (Ahmed & Matulevičius 2014), has as main goal to secure data, that is stored into 
a business data store, against internal attacks that aim to obstruct the data, exploiting that 
the data is stored in plain text. In the described scenario an internal attacker or malware, 
attempting to access a business data store where sensitive data is stored. The attack occurs 
due to the data being stored in a plain format, and leads to the loss of the confidentiality of 
the stored data and the perpetual damage of the files residing in the same instance as 
malicious script. In Table 9 we utilise the security risk oriented pattern template in order to 
represent a detailed overview of the pattern and move forward with the representation of the 
pattern using RAST. 
Table 9 - SRP5 Asset Identification and Mitigation 
 
In Figure 8.20 we identify as the business asset the Data that is stored, and repre-
sented as a resource that is decomposed from the main IS asset of this scenario that is the 
Data store resource, which is decomposed form the plan Store / retrieve the data into 
the data store that is the means to the achievement of the main goal of Data stored / 
retrieved of the actor. In this instance we identify as security criterion the Confidentiality 
of the business data, which is represented by a softgoal that has a positive contribution by 
the security constraint of Maintain the stored data confidential. This constraint restricts 
Security scenario & security context identification 
Pattern Name Securing business data stored/retrieved from a data store. 
Pattern Decision This pattern ensures that the data stored in the businesses’ data store is 
secure against internal attacks. 
Asset-related Concepts 
Business Asset Stored data 
IS Asset Data store  
Security Criterion Confidentiality of the stored data 
Risk-related Concepts 
Risk An attacker or malware with the intention to compromise the stored data 
directly accesses the data store in the data store enabled by the fact that 
the data is stored in a plain format leading in the loss of the confidentiality 
of the stored data, and additional perpetual damage to the files residing in 
the same instance as the malicious script. 
Impact  Loss of the confidentiality of the stored data 
 Perpetual damage to the files residing in the same instance as 
malicious script. 
Event An attacker or malware intending to obstruct the stored data directly ac-
cesses the businesses’ data store, enabled by the data being stored in a 
plain text format. 
Threat An attacker or malware with the intention to compromise the stored data 
directly accesses the data in the data store. 
Vulnerability Data is stored in a plain format 
Threat Agent An attacker or malware with the intention to compromise the stored data 
in the data store. 
Attack Method An attacker or malware directly accesses the data store in the data store 
Risk Treatment-related Concepts 
Risk Treatment Risk reduction 
Security Requirement Make unreadable the data before 
storing them to the data-store. 
Make the data readable when it is 
retrieved from the data-store. 
Control Cryptographic algorithm - the data is encrypted after it is submitted in the 
data sore from the input interface and decrypted when it needs to be pre-
sented to the client. 
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the previously mentioned goal that assists in the achievement of the goal of the Storing / 
Retrieval Interface actor. In Figure 8.20 we introduce a secure goal of Confidentiality of 
the stored data ensured that satisfies the main security constraint of the actor. This secure 
goal is achieved by completing the secure plan of Ensure data confidentiality. 
 
Fig 8.20 - SRP5 Modelling of Business Assets 
 
Fig 8.21 - SRP5 Modelling of IS Assets 
In event of a security attack in Figure 8.22 we identify as a threat Access the un-
encrypted data that has an impact on the security criterion of Confidentiality resulting in 
harm. In Figure 8.23 we represent the potential attack scenario of an Attacker actor that 
having as main malicious goal Stored data obtained executes the malicious plan of Ac-
cess plain-text data in the data store that attacks the plan Access plain-text data in 
the data store of the Data Store actor. The malicious plan of the attacker exploits the non-
fulfilment of the Ensure data confidentiality secure plan. 
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Fig 8.22 - SRP5 Attack Identification  
 
Fig 8.23 - SRP5 Potential Attack Scenario 
In order to address the identified risks SRP5 in Figure 8.24 introduces a crypto-
graphic procedure that encrypts the data before storing it and decrypts it before delivering it 
back to the requester. Here we replace the secure plan of Ensure data confidentiality with 
Perform cryptographic procedures decomposed into Encrypt data and Decrypt data 
represented with a dotted pattern indicating that is along with the secure goal and constraint 
are security requirement. 
 
Fig 8.24 - SRP5 Risk Treatment and Security Requirements Definition 
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VI. Case Study Participant Reports 
In this section we include reports for each of the participants of the Case Study of 
Chapter 6. In the reports certain pattern application diagrams are not included. The diagrams 
of asset extraction and model introduction are not included because they do not add value 
to the reports. Moreover we mark with a circle in each diagram mistakes made by the 
participants. As mistakes we consider all the solution that do not conform to the correct 
pattern applications of section VI of the Appendix. 
 
PARTICIPANT A 
Background 
Participant A is at the time of the case study being conducted a Software Engineering master 
degree student. The participant has knowledge of the ISSRM domain model, process and 
security requirement elicitation. The participant attended the entire introductory lecture of 
the case study and completed the application of two patterns in the given model. The patterns 
to be applied by participant A are SRP2, SRP4. 
Pattern Application 
SRP2 
The timeframe required by the participant in order to apply the SRP2 was roughly around 
one and a half hour. Participant A correctly identified that the pattern is applicable in the 
user interface actor of the case study model presented in Chapter 6. SRP2 identifies and 
mitigates the threat of malicious data being propagated between business services. The 
participant isolated correctly the assets involved in the pattern (see Figure 8.25) and applied 
security constraints and criteria that restrict the main goal. Moreover he followed the 
guidelines and applied correctly the secure goals. Furthermore he correctly introduced 
secure plans that assist in the achievement of the goals (see Figure 8.26). The participant 
made the minor phrasing mistake of adding “Data” to all the phrases that include “User 
Info”. The addition is unnecessary and it might introduce confusion in later steps. 
 
Fig 8.25 - PA SRP2 applied STEP 2 (a) 
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Fig 8.26 - PA SRP2 applied STEP 2 (b) 
Following the application of the security constraints, criteria, goals and plans the participant 
correctly replaced the secure plan Ensure Confidentiality & Integrity of the User Info 
Data with the requirement suggested by the pattern (see Figure 8.27). 
 
Fig 8.27 - PA SRP2 applied STEP 3 
The application of the fourth step was as well performed correctly, demonstrating the events 
of an attack. The participant used correctly the model in order to justify the security 
requirements introduced in the previous third step (see Figure 8.28). 
 
Fig 8.28 - PA SRP2 applied STEP 4 
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SRP4 
In the application of this pattern the participant took the liberty of not applying it to an 
existing part of the model. Although the participant could apply the pattern to an existing 
part, he decided that the user interface provided the functionality of retrieving data and thus 
making SRP4 applicable (see Figure 8.29). The participant repeated the same phrasing 
minor mistake he made in the application of SRP2. 
 
Fig 8.29 - PA SRP4 applied STEP 2 (a) 
 
Fig 8.30 - PA SRP4 applied STEP 2 (b) 
Following the participant’s assumption, the rest of the process was correctly continued by 
introducing the suggested secure constructs (see Figure 8.30). Moreover the introduction of 
the new secure requirements was performed accurately (see Figure 8.31). 
 
Fig 8.31 - PA SRP4 applied STEP 3 
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Lastly the validation and rationale step was performed correctly (see Figure 8.32). The 
participant correctly justified the assets to be attacked and exploited. Important to note that 
the participant followed all the phrasing conventions for goals and plans. 
 
Fig 8.32 - PA SRP4 applied STEP 4 
Observations 
After the introductory lecture the participant had a few questions regarding phrasing and 
modeling of connections. Overall the process was completed accurately and the participant 
was able to use two patterns described by our suggested pattern representation. Furthermore 
we asses that the previous knowledge of the ISSRM principles had a positive contribution 
to the participants overall performance. 
 
Remarks 
The participant gave an overall positive feedback to all the questions of the questionnaire. 
Main question where related to the application process. Negative feedback was directed 
towards the limited time amount. On this behalf, the conclusion arises that more time is 
needed for grasping the process. Lastly, the participant had positive impressions regarding 
the pattern representation and application process. 
 
PARTICIPANT B 
Background 
Participant B (PB) is a Software Engineering master degree graduate student at the time of 
the study being conducted. The participant is employed in the field of enterprise security. 
The participant is moderately familiar with the ISSRM domain model, process and security 
requirement elicitation. The participant attended the entire introductory lecture of the case 
study and completed the application of one pattern in the given model. The pattern applied 
by participant PB was SRP5. 
Pattern Application 
SRP5 
PB required roughly 45 minutes in order to apply the SRP5. PB correctly identified that the 
pattern is applicable in the internet store actor of the case study model presented in Chapter 
6. SRP5 identifies and mitigates the threat of business data stored in a data store being 
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obstructed. The attack occurs by exploiting the fact that the data is stored in plaintext. The 
participant isolated correctly the assets involved in the pattern (see Figure 8.33) and applied 
security constraints and criteria that restrict the main goal. Moreover he followed the 
guidelines and applied correctly the secure goals and the plans to be executed in order for 
them to be achieved (see Figure 8.34). The recurring mistake made by the participant is the 
decomposition of the resources. The participant decomposes the resource from the database 
resource incorrectly. 
 
Fig 8.33 - PB SRP5 applied STEP 2 (a) 
 
Fig 8.34 - PB SRP5 applied STEP 2 (b) 
After the application of the security constraints, criteria, goals and plans PB succeeded and 
correctly replaced the secure plan of Stored data confidentiality ensured with the 
requirement suggested by the pattern (see Figure 8.35). 
 
Fig 8.35 - PB SRP5 applied STEP 3 
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As participant A,  PB executed the forth step correctly demonstrating the events of an attack. 
The participant implemented successfully the model in order to justify the security 
requirements introduced in the previous third step (see Figure 8.36). 
 
 
Fig 8.36 - PB SRP5 applied STEP 4 
Observations 
After the introductory lecture PB asked several questions concerning the performance of the 
pre-processing step.  B preferred not to perform the pre-processing and moved directly 
forward by applying security constraints and criteria during step 2. In general, the process 
was executed accurately and PB was able to utilize one pattern described by our suggested 
pattern representation.  B´s previous knowledge of the ISSRM principles is interpreted as a 
success-factor of the participant’s performance. 
Remarks 
The participant gave a positive feedback to all the questions of the questionnaire. Main 
comments concerned the RAST process. Similarly to other participants, PB also commented 
the given timeframe as too short. According to PB, participants would gain deeper 
understanding from more time.  PB was moderately satisfied with the pattern presentation. 
One of his observations indicated that a larger amounts of examples would be required in 
order to better understand the overall process. The participant found the step of identifying 
the pattern occurrence as the easiest to perform. The most difficult step to be executed 
according to PB, was the introduction of the security requirements. Lastly the participant 
had positive impressions regarding the pattern representation and application process. 
  
 PARTICIPANT C 
Background 
Participant C (PC) is a Software Engineering master degree student at the time of the study 
being conducted. PC is employed in the field of IT enterprise security. The participant has 
previous knowledge of the ISSRM domain model, process and security requirement 
elicitation. The participant attended the entire introductory lecture of the case study and 
completed the application of two patterns in the given model. The patterns to be applied by 
participant PC are SRP1, SRP3. 
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Pattern Application 
SRP1 
Participant C required around 1 hour to apply the SRP1. PC successfully identified that the 
pattern is applicable in the user interface and internet store actor of the case study model 
presented in Chapter 6. SRP1 identifies and mitigates the threat of data being intercepted 
when transmitted between business services. The participant isolated correctly the assets 
involved in the pattern (see Figure 8.37) and applied security constraints and criteria that 
restrict the main goal. Moreover applied correctly the secure goals and the plans to be 
executed in order for them to be achieved (see Figure 8.38). In this instance the participant 
incorrectly phrased the secure goal where instead of “User Info” he wrote “Data”. The 
mistake here is crucial. This because it will affect the security requirements resulting from 
the process. Thus incorrectly security a different process and resources. Furthermore 
participant C did not specify that the user actor implies the existence of an interface. PC 
decided to follow a different modeling structure. 
 
Fig 8.37 - PC SRP1 applied STEP 2 (a) 
 
Fig 8.38 - PC SRP1 applied STEP 2 (b) 
Following the application of the security constraints, criteria, goals and plans the participant 
correctly replaced the secure plan of Ensure Confidentiality & Integrity of the User Info 
in both the user interface and internet with the requirement suggested by the pattern (see 
Figure 8.39). 
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Fig 8.39 - PC SRP1 applied STEP 3 
The participant executed the forth step showing the events of an attack. The model justified 
the security requirements introduced in the previous step (see Figure 8.40). PC incorrectly 
phrased most assets of the Attacker and Transmission Medium. C incorrectly used in the 
phrasing “Submitted data” instead of “User info” that is the actual transmitted data.  
 
Fig 8.40 - PC SRP1 applied STEP 4 
SRP3 
PC identified that SRP3 is applicable in the internet store actor of the given model. SRP3 
identifies and mitigates the threat of a denial of service attack to a business service. He 
identified and isolated incorrectly the assets involved in the pattern (see Figure 8.41) and 
applied security constraints and criteria that restrict the main goal. PC incorrectly phrases 
the security constraint and wrongfully decomposes the main plans.  Additionally in STEP 2 
(a) PC incorrectly restricts Message is registered goal (see Figure 8.42). As the other 
respondents, PC applied secure goals and plans to be executed. The participant incorrectly 
phrases the secure goals and plans where he does not specifically state the provided service. 
 
Fig 8.41 - PC SRP3 applied STEP 2 (a) 
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Fig 8.42 - PC SRP3 applied STEP 2 (b) 
Following the application of the security constraints, criteria, goals and plans the participant 
correctly replaced the secure plan of Ensure provided service availability of the internet 
store actor with the requirement suggested by the pattern (see Figure 8.43). 
 
Fig 8.43 - PC SRP3 applied STEP 3 
Lastly the validation and rationale step was performed incorrectly (see Figure 8.44). The 
participant incorrectly justified the assets to be attack and exploited. Though here he made 
a considerable number of phrasing mistakes. The mistakes made in this stage introduce 
ambiguity and defeat the purpose of validating the previously introduced requirements. 
 
Fig 8.44 - PC SRP3 applied STEP 3 
 
 
75 
 
Observations 
After the introductory lecture, PC had no questions due to his familiarity with the ISSRM 
process and previous knowledge of Secure Tropos. The overall process was executed 
accurately despite phrasing mistakes were made. Additionally the participant was able to 
utilize both patterns described by our suggested pattern representation. Furthermore we 
asses that the previous familiarity of the participant with the involved concepts had 
significant impact in the results leading us to confirm that the process of learning the pattern 
application process is easier for the participant with a security background. 
 
Remarks 
PC gave positive feedback, with main comments being directed towards the structuring of 
the constructs. Furthermore the participant found the step of identifying the pattern 
occurrence as the easiest to perform. The most difficult step to be executed according to the 
participant was the re-integration of the extracted assets. The participant had positive 
impressions regarding the pattern representation and application process. 
 
 PARTICIPANT D 
Background 
Participant D (PD) is Software Engineering master degree student at the time of the study 
being conducted. The participant was previously unfamiliar with the ISSRM domain model, 
process and security requirement elicitation. The participant attended the entire introductory 
lecture of the case study and completed the application of one pattern in the given model. 
The pattern applied by participant D was SRP4. 
 
Pattern Application 
SRP4 
To apply the SRP5 PD required around one hour. PD precisely identified that the pattern is 
applicable in the user interface actor of the case study model presented in Chapter 6. SRP4 
identifies and mitigates the threat of confidential business data being accessed by an 
attacker. The attack occurs by exploiting the fact that there is no access control mechanism 
in place. The participant isolated correctly the assets involved in the pattern (see Figure 
8.45) and applied security constraints and criteria that restrict the main goal. Comparing D’s 
models with the correct ones of section VII is identified that he incorrectly phrases in the 
security constraint “Maintain password confidentiality” instead of “Maintain data 
confidentiality”. This leads to perpetual ambiguity regarding the subject that the security 
constraint restricts. Moreover he applied correctly the secure goals and the plans to be 
executed in order for them to be achieved (see Figure 8.46). The participant incorrectly 
phrased the secure goals and plans where instead of “password” he states “user info”. 
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Fig 8.45 - PD SRP4 applied STEP 2 (a) 
 
Fig 8.46 - PD SRP4 applied STEP 2 (b) 
Following the application of the security constraints, criteria, goals and plans PD 
successfully replaced the secure plan of Ensure the confidentiality of the user info with 
the requirement suggested by the pattern (see Figure 8.47). Nonetheless here PD caries over 
the incorrect phrasing of the previous constructs. 
 
Fig 8.47 - PD SRP4 applied STEP 3 
Participant D correctly executed the composition and modeling of the assets of the fourth 
step correctly, nonetheless mistakes were made in phrasing (see Figure 8.48). The 
incorrectness yet again in this case occurs in the phrasing of the assets. In this instance the 
assets of the attacker mistakenly refer “Data” as the subject of the attack instead of 
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“Password”. Additionally all the assets of the user interface actor incorrectly use the term 
“User Info” instead of “Password”. 
 
Fig 8.48 - PD SRP4 applied STEP 4 
Observations 
Due to lacking knowledge, PD had numerous questions after the introductory lecture. Most 
of the questions were concerned with the risk assessment process and the pattern application 
rationale. As the majority of the participants, PD chose not to perform the pre-processing. 
The participant applied the security constraints and criteria during the second step of the 
process. Overall the modeling part of the process was followed accurately though mistakes 
were made in the phrasing of the assets. Overall the participant was not confident in his 
performance. Furthermore we asses that the having no previous knowledge of the ISSRM 
principles did not affect the overall pattern application process. 
Remarks 
The participant gave an overall moderated assessment to the questionnaire. Most of the 
participants´ questions where directed towards the RAST process. Similar to other 
participants the limited timeframe was criticized. According to PD more time would ensure 
a better understanding of the pattern. The participant found the step of extracting the 
identified assets related to the pattern as the easiest to perform. The most difficult step to be 
executed according to the participant was the identification of the pattern occurrence. Lastly 
the participant had positive impressions regarding the pattern representation and application 
process. 
 
PARTICIPANT E 
Background 
Participant E (PE) is a Software Engineering master degree student at the time of the study 
being conducted. The participant was previously unfamiliar with the ISSRM domain model, 
process and security requirement elicitation. PE attended the entire introductory lecture of 
the case study and completed the application of one pattern in the given model. The pattern 
to be applied by PE is SRP1. 
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Pattern Application 
SRP1 
E required around one and half hour to apply the SRP1. PE correctly identified that the 
pattern is applicable in the user interface actor of the case study model presented in Chapter 
6. SRP1 identifies and mitigates the threat of data being intercepted when transmitted 
between business services. The participant isolated correctly most of the assets involved in 
the pattern (see Figure 8.49) except for the User info resource that was neglected. 
Additionally PE incorrectly connected the Insert data to datastore plan to the User info 
received goal with a Means-ends instead of the decomposition link. Comparing PE’s 
models with the correct ones of section VII is identified that he incorrectly applied security 
constraints and criteria that restrict the main goals by overlooking the phrasing conventions 
and used the exact phrasing used for the assets of SRP1 pattern. Moreover he followed the 
guidelines and modeled correctly the secure goals and the plans, again by overlooking 
phrasing conventions (see Figure 8.50). Furthermore the participant did not model correctly 
the link between the security constraint and criterion (see Figure 8.49, 8.50).  In addition 
PD incorrectly modeled the direction of the dependency in both STEP2 a and b. 
 
Fig 8.49 - PE SRP1 applied STEP 2 (a) 
 
Fig 8.50 - PE SRP1 applied STEP 2 (b) 
Following the application of the security constraints, criteria, goals and plans the participant 
correctly replaced the secure plan of Ensure confidentiality & integrity of the submitted 
data with the requirement suggested by the pattern (see Figure 8.51). In this step the par-
ticipant modeled incorrectly the construct of the threat. 
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Fig 8.51 - PE SRP1 applied STEP 3 
The application of the fourth step was performed incorrectly demonstrating the events of an 
attack (see Figure 8.52). Here PD repeatedly addresses the transmitted information as “Sub-
mited” data instead of “User info”. This results in the diagram being unusable to justify the 
introduced requirements. 
 
Fig 8.52 - PE SRP1 applied STEP 4 
Observations 
After the introductory lecture PE had multiple questions regarding the ISSRM process and 
the RAST process. Overall the process was not executed accurately despite the participant 
was able to utilize one pattern described by our suggested pattern representation. Addition-
ally the phrasing and coloring conventions were not followed correctly. The participant 
stated that he did not comprehend the need for the differentiated phrasing and colors. In this 
case we asses that having no previous knowledge of the ISSRM principles had a negative 
contribution to the participants overall performance. 
 
Remarks 
The participant reported an overall moderate feedback to all the questions of the question-
naire. Main comments were stated regarding the ISSRM and RAST processes. One of his 
observations indicated that a greater amount of time is required for grasping the process. 
Furthermore the participant found the step of identifying the pattern occurrence as the easi-
est to perform. The most difficult step to be executed according to the participant was the 
introduction of the security 
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PARTICIPANT F 
Background 
Participant F (PF) is a Software Engineering master degree student at the time this study 
being conducted. The Participant is employed in the field of software engineering. The par-
ticipant had a small familiarity with the ISSRM domain model and process. PF attended the 
entire introductory lecture of the case study and completed the application of one pattern in 
the given model. The pattern applied by F was SRP2. 
 
Pattern Application 
SRP2 
PF required roughly 45 minutes to apply the SRP5. PF correctly identified that the pattern 
is applicable in the internet store actor of the case study model presented in Chapter 6. SRP2 
identifies and mitigates the threat of malicious data being propagated between business ser-
vices. The participant extracted correctly the assets involved in the pattern (see Figure 8.53) 
and applied security constraints and criteria that restrict the main goal. Moreover he fol-
lowed the guidelines and applied correctly the secure goals and the plans to be executed (see 
Figure 8.54). In both steps the participant referees incorrectly in the secure con-
straint/goal/plan to the user info as data thus introducing ambiguity.  
 
Fig 8.53 - PF SRP2 applied STEP 2 (a) 
 
Fig 8.54 - PF SRP2 applied STEP 2 (b) 
Following the application of the security constraints, criteria, goals and plans the participant 
correctly replaced the secure plan Ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the inserted 
data with the requirement suggested by the pattern (see Figure 8.55). In this instance par-
ticipant F reuses the incorrect phrasing introduced in the first two steps. 
81 
 
 
Fig 8.55 - PF SRP2 applied STEP 3 
The modeling of the fourth step was performed correctly by the participant demonstrating 
the events of an attack (see Figure 8.56). Though here Comparing PF’s models with the 
correct ones of section VII we observe that the phrasing of the malicious goal is incorrect. 
The participant named the malicious goal as “Internet Store Activity Harmed” instead of 
“User info database harmed”. 
 
Fig 8.56 - PF SRP2 applied STEP 4 
Observations 
After the introductory lecture the participant had multiple questions regarding the pattern 
representation and application. PF chose not to perform the pre-processing step. Overall the 
process was executed moderately accurately and the participant was able to utilize one pat-
tern described by our suggested pattern representation. Furthermore we asses that the small 
previous knowledge of the ISSRM principles had a considerable contribution to the partic-
ipants overall performance. 
Remarks 
The feedback regarding the questionnaire of PF can be evaluated as overall positive. Main 
comments revolved regarding the pattern representation. F shared the negative aspect of 
lacking time as indicated by the other respondents. PF observed that a longer explanations 
are required for the patterns in order to be understandable at first glance. The participant 
found the step of identifying the pattern occurrence as the easiest to perform. The most 
difficult step to be executed according to the participant was the re-integration of the ex-
tracted assets. Finally the participant had positive impressions regarding the pattern repre-
sentation and application process. 
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VII. Correct Pattern Applications 
For the purpose comparing the results of the participants of the case study conducted in 
Chapter 6 in this section we present the correct models of the patterns presented in this work. 
The patterns are applied to the internet store model presented in Chapter 6. In Figure 8.57 
we identify where each pattern is applicable in the model. 
 
Fig 8.57 - SRP’s identified in the Internet Store model 
In detail individually the patterns are applicable for: 
SRP1: Applicable in the User (User Interface) actor and Internet Store actor. SRP1 is 
applicable for the dependency of Send user info between the two actors.  
 
 
Fig 8.58 - Case Study, SRP1 Correct Application STEP2 (a) 
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Fig 8.59 - Case Study, SRP1 Correct Application STEP2 (b) 
 
Fig 8.60 - Case Study, SRP1 Correct Application STEP3 
 
Fig 8.61 - Case Study, SRP1 Correct Application STEP4 
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SRP2: Applicable in the Internet Store actor for the goal of User info received. 
 
Fig 8.62 - Case Study, SRP2 Correct Application STEP2 (a) 
 
Fig 8.63 - Case Study, SRP2 Correct Application STEP2 (b) 
 
Fig 8.64 - Case Study, SRP2 Correct Application STEP3 
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Fig 8.65 - Case Study, SRP2 Correct Application STEP4 
SRP3: Applicable in the Internet Store actor. SRP3 applies for the dependency of Request 
to register between the User (User Interface) actor and Internet Store actor. The security 
measures related to this pattern are applicable for the Message is registered. 
 
Fig 8.66 - Case Study, SRP3 Correct Application STEP2 (a) 
 
Fig 8.67 - Case Study, SRP3 Correct Application STEP2 (b) 
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Fig 8.68 - Case Study, SRP3 Correct Application STEP3 
 
Fig 8.69 - Case Study, SRP3 Correct Application STEP4 
 
SRP4: Applicable in the User (User Interface) for the goal of Password Reset. 
 
Fig 8.70 - Case Study, SRP4 Correct Application STEP2 (a) 
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Fig 8.71 - Case Study, SRP4 Correct Application STEP2 (b) 
 
Fig 8.72 - Case Study, SRP4 Correct Application STEP3 
 
Fig 8.73 - Case Study, SRP4 Correct Application STEP4 
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SRP5: Applicable in the Internet Store actor at the goal Data is inserted to the database.  
 
Fig 8.74 - Case Study, SRP5 Correct Application STEP2 (a) 
 
Fig 8.75 - Case Study, SRP5 Correct Application STEP2 (b) 
 
Fig 8.76 - Case Study, SRP5 Correct Application STEP3 
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Fig 8.77 - Case Study, SRP5 Correct Application STEP4 
 
Fig 8.78 - All the Patterns Correctly Re-Integrated In the Model (STEP5) 
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VIII. Case Study Questionnaire Answers 
Group A includes participants PA, PB, PC and Group B includes PD, PE and PF. 
 PA 
 
PB PC PD PE PF 
1) How easy is to learn to apply the RAST process? c c c b c b 
a) Not at all Easy b) Slightly Easy c) Moderately Easy d) Very Easy       
2) How understandable was the RAST application process? c b c b c b 
a) Not at all Understandable b) Slightly Understandable c) Moderately Understandable d) Very Understandable       
3) How easy is to learn a pattern expressed in RAST? c c d c d c 
a) Not at all Easy b) Slightly Easy c) Moderately Easy d) Very Easy       
4) How satisfied are you with the overall presentation of the RAST patterns? c d d c d c 
a) Not at all satisfied b) Slightly Satisfied c) Moderately Satisfied d) Very satisfied       
5) How understandable were the RAST patterns? c c c c c c 
a) Not at all Understandable b) Slightly Understandable c) Moderately Understandable d) Very Understandable       
6) How easy is to pre-process a given model? c c c b a b 
a) Not at all Easy b) Slightly Easy c) Moderately Easy d) Very Easy       
7) How easy is to identify goal/plan/resource/dependencies that are under risk? c d c b c c 
a) Not at all Easy b) Slightly Easy c) Moderately Easy d) Very Easy       
8) How easy is to apply constraints and security criteria to a goal/plan/resource/dependencies? b c d c d c 
a) Not at all Easy b) Slightly Easy c) Moderately Easy d) Very Easy       
9) How easy is to identify where the pattern is applicable within the main model? c b c b c c 
a) Not at all Easy b) Slightly Easy c) Moderately Easy d) Very Easy       
10) How easy is to extract the assets involved in pattern from the main model? c b c b c b 
a) Not at all Easy b) Slightly Easy c) Moderately Easy d) Very Easy       
11) How easy is to replicate/adjust the pattern to a not previously encounter model? b c c b c c 
a) Not at all Easy b) Slightly Easy c) Moderately Easy d) Very Easy       
12) How easy is to identify/apply secure goals and plans to the assets of an actor? b b c b c c 
a) Not at all Easy b) Slightly Easy c) Moderately Easy d) Very Easy       
13) How easy is to replace secure goals and plans with the controls suggested by a pattern? c b c b c c 
a) Not at all Easy b) Slightly Easy c) Moderately Easy d) Very Easy       
14) How easy is to re-integrate the previously extracted portion of the main model with the security require-
ments applied? b c c b c c 
a) Not at all Easy b) Slightly Easy c) Moderately Easy d) Very Easy       
15) Which step of the application process steps was the most easiest to apply? b b b c b b 
a) Step 0, Model Pre-Processing       
b) Step 1, Occurrence Identification & Asset Alignment       
c) Step 2, Asset Extraction & Secure Goal Introduction       
d) Step 3, Security Requirement Introduction       
e) Step 4, Security Requirement Rationale & Validation       
f) Step 5, Extracted Model Re-Integration       
16) Which step of the application process steps was the most difficult to apply? d d f b d f 
a) Step 0, Model Pre-Processing       
b) Step 1, Occurrence Identification & Asset Alignment       
c) Step 2, Asset Extraction & Secure Goal Introduction       
d) Step 3, Security Requirement Introduction       
e) Step 4, Security Requirement Rationale & Validation       
f) Step 5, Extracted Model Re-Integration       
17) How easy is to learn the pattern application process overall? d c c c c d 
a) Not at all Easy b) Slightly Easy c) Moderately Easy d) Very Easy       
18) How easy do you believe that the pattern application process is? c b c b c c 
a) Not at all Easy b) Slightly Easy c) Moderately Easy d) Very Easy       
19) How efficient do you believe that the application process is? d c c c c c 
a) Not at all Efficient b) Slightly Efficient c) Moderately Efficient d) Very Efficient       
20) How understandable was the pattern application process overall? c d c c c c 
a) Not at all Understandable b) Slightly Understandable c) Moderately Understandable d) Very Understandable       
21) How satisfied are you with the results of the pattern application process overall? c b c b c b 
a) Not at all satisfied b) Slightly Satisfied c) Moderately Satisfied d) Very satisfied       
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